Dispute resolution mechanisms and teacher bargaining outcomes

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-1-1996

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of dispute resolution mechanisms on the wages and hours of public school teachers. The 43-state analysis presents evidence that (1) a permissible right to strike increases teacher wages by 11.5 percent and reduces class hours by 37 minutes per day; (2) a de facto right to strike increases salaries by 5.7 percent and reduces class hours by 44 minutes per day; (3) arbitration availability is associated with a wage effect of 3.6 percent and 70 fewer class minutes per day; and (4) factfinding and voluntary arbitration have no significant influences on outcomes. A direct comparison of the right to strike and the right to arbitrate indicates that a legal right to strike affords teachers greater power to increase the dollar value of their work.

Comments

Published as:

Zigarelli, M. A. (1996). Dispute resolution mechanisms and teacher bargaining outcomes. Journal of Labor Research, 17(1), 135–148. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685789

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