Title

Saving our Souls from Materialism

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2016

Abstract

We refute three key claims against dualism: (1) the claim that dualism implies that we would not expect to observe such a radical causal dependence of our conscious lives on the physical world, which is what we do observe; (2) the claim that dualism implies mysteries beyond necessity, and hence that dualism is, theoretically speaking, less simple than physicalism; and (3) that dualism implies a metaphysical simple (e.g., a human soul) is incapable of undergoing a process of development. We conclude by arguing that based on the underlying preferences of scientific thought, dualism is currently the most scientifically feasible account on offer with respect to subjective experience.

Comments

Originally published as:

LaRock, E., & Collins, R. (2016). Saving our souls from materialism. In T. M. Crisp (Ed.), Neuroscience and the Soul (pp. 137–146).

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