Nonviolence in the Real World

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11 May 2004
HON 498
Advisor: Dr Gordon Brubacher
A fundamental question throughout history, both past history and unfolding history, is the question of whether oppression should be opposed and changes should be attempted through violence or nonviolence. Conventional wisdom usually assumes that violent means are more reliable, indeed that violent means are the only type of response that carries the potential for success against ruthless opponents or overwhelming odds. But is this truly the case? *When real-life conflicts are researched and observed, it becomes clear that nonviolent power is often far more successful than violent power, even to the point of being applicable in a wider variety of conflict situations.*

The two most well-known proponents and leaders of nonviolent resistances, familiar to young and old alike, are Martin Luther King, Jr, and Mahatma Gandhi. Their situations are often excused, however, as having the benefit of occurring “in the Godly democracy of America” or “against the civilized British.” Ignored are the jailings, torture, fire hoses, attack dogs, burning crosses, white hoods, lynchings, firebombs, rapes, and more that King and his fellow Freedom Fighters faced. Ignored are the massive political imprisonments; the massacre of at least 379 townspeople at Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar, with almost 1,500 casualties\(^1\) (Dirks); the subsequent “crawling order” which “required Indians to crawl on the ground when approached by a British soldier” and the public floggings which were the penalty for disobedience (“Bringing Down”); the brutal humiliations; the strippings and beatings of women; and more that Gandhi and his compatriots faced. These were not “easy resistances” against “relatively benevolent oppressors,” but rather were revolutions against racism and domination akin to that of the Nazis.

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\(^{1}\) After which the commanding officer General Dyer “said he was sorry he ran out of ammunition” and was seen by the British public as “a hero defending Britain’s rightful imperial role in the East” (Dirks).
The most recent war against Iraq is commonly justified as the only response available against such a corrupt, violent dictator as Saddam Hussein. This is despite the fact that Saddam Hussein was responsible for a comparable number of deaths (if not fewer) than the British Empire’s mass colonizations, with Hussein’s levels of cruelty and repression of dissenters easily matched by the British Raj and white supremacists alike. If oppressors of the Western World can be resisted and overwhelmed by nonviolent resistance, then similar methods should also be able to work elsewhere. Despite vast religion and worldview varieties and the “clash of civilizations” touted by Samuel Huntington, we are all ultimately and most deeply “human.” Different rhetoric and reasoning is used, but in the core analysis one group’s brutal repression bears deep commonalities with every other group’s brutal repression. The circumstances and specifics are the only points which truly vary.

Jack DuVall, in a recent issue of the Christian magazine Sojourners, relates an insightful story regarding violent and nonviolent potential in conflict:

In 2002, an Iraqi opponent of Saddam said he liked nonviolent resistance, but that Saddam was like Stalin – therefore it wasn’t possible. He was asked what would happen if 5,000 people demonstrated in Baghdad. He said they’d all be shot. What if 20,000 should demonstrate? Same result, though much bloodier, he said. But what if 100,000 Iraqis should protest, demanding that Saddam go? He hesitated. Well, if that happened, he said, then things might go differently. Why? Because if that many Iraqis were determined to resist, the dictator’s defenders would realize that fear as an instrument of power no longer worked – that Saddam had lost control of the country. Suddenly an impervious regime had been reduced in this Iraqi’s mind to a strategic problem. (DuVall 21)

One of the key lessons to be learned through an empirical study of nonviolent conflict is that all conflict situations boil down to a matter of logistics. Only the hypothetical, ad hoc “what if…?” questions can completely undermine this logistic potential. Then again, studies of violent conflict yield the same conclusions: a good enough strategy and logistics can alone accomplish most goals, and the hypothetical, ad hoc “what if…?” questions can prevail against any attempt.
So then the issues which must be addressed is whether violent means or nonviolent means have a greater potential for success, greater short and long term costs, greater short and long term rewards, et cetera. To do so seriously requires studies of nonviolent conflicts which are as intricate as the plethora of studies of violent conflicts. This study may very well lead us to the same conclusion to which it has led Gene Sharp of the Albert Einstein Institute, that “we may be able to give up military weapons for the same reason we gave up bows and arrows – not because they are wicked and immoral – but because we have discovered a better weapons system.”

Another critique of violent alternatives is conceptual: rather than being wholly wrong, they are a “somewhat contemptible, unimaginative resort to the same old ways” (Taylor 105). The search for nonviolent alternatives, on the other hand, is more than simply the refusal to use violent means, but rather it is the search for new and creative ways to solve the problem. Violent solutions almost invariably complicate and increase the problems they attempt to solve; we see this in the post-World War I Treaty of Versailles dynamics which gave Hitler his appeal, in the Cold War between capitalism and communism which grew out of World War II, in the cycles of killings between Israelis and Palestinians, and in the current “quagmires” of United States military occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Modern-day wars invariably kill civilians – whether in the razing of Baghdad or in the destruction of the World Trade Center – and the death of innocents invariably prompts reciprocal rage and comparable responses. Only by redirecting and re-forming these responses can these cycles be broken. Nonviolent solutions do this by changing the type of weapons being used, by disabling the ideological, presumed power of violence. Mark Lewis Taylor gives an appropriate disclaimer here:

It must also be acknowledged that, from the perspective of history, sometimes – and I stress sometimes and not as a rule – strategic and limited violence has been an effective tool against imperial oppression. Nevertheless, even when that seems to be the case, it is not so much
because of the violence itself, so much as it is the dramatic and creative modes of its application. (Taylor 109)

Creativity and drama are the crucial elements which Taylor sees in the combat of oppression, while “violence” or “nonviolence” are merely the means of carrying and presenting these key elements. Additionally, participants in conflicts usually believe in their own justification and righteousness, and the best and purest way to clarify that is with creativity and drama implemented through nonviolence. Peoples and cultures in many situations have accepted the nonviolent challenges of logistics, creativity, and drama in conflict situations.

People Power

Ferdinand Marcos — “the Hitler of Southeast Asia” who kept unconstitutional power through a suspended (and then rewritten) constitution, assassinations, bribery, arrests, and terror — was overthrown in the Philippines by a native movement known as “People Power.” In 1983, the opposition leader Senator Benigno Aquino, a strong proponent of nonviolence, was assassinated. Given his stance on violence, his supporters determined to pursue opposition to Marcos in Aquino’s way. Many workshops were held throughout the country, especially in churches, and the civilian population (lower, middle, and upper classes) was well-trained in the ways of actively using nonviolence to resist Marcos. The population was not entirely united in their opposition to Marcos, but they came together to support the dead senator’s widow, Corazon “Cory” Aquino, when Marcos attempted to prove he had support in an impromptu election in late 1985. They used marches, petitions, trained poll watchers, and an independent polling commission to counter Marcos’ dictatorial power and violent intimidation and harassment of voters; during the counting of the votes, thirty of the computer operators walked out in protest

2 Hence, such leaders as King and Gandhi are venerated widely, while most war heroes are widely respected only until records of their actions are declassified.
3 General references for each section are grouped at each section’s end.
when they saw that the counting was being falsified, risking their lives to tell their story on international press. After the election, Cory received the support of the Catholic church in her call for the people to “experiment with nonviolent forms of protest,” such as a one-day work stoppage and a boycott of Marcos-controlled banks, stores and newspapers. In calling for one-day work strikes, the need for drama is recognized; in calling for nonviolent protest experimentation, Cory clearly understood the additional need for creativity throughout the revolution. In early 1986, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Deputy Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos defect, along with a few hundred troops, and barricade themselves in the Defense Ministry headquarters in Manila. Marcos’ response (as befits a true brutal dictator) was simple:

“They are cornered. ... [They] can be easily wiped out with simple artillery and tank fire. ... I intend to stay as President and if necessary I will defend this position with all the force at my disposal.” (VanHise, “People Power”)

In response to a call by Radio Veritas (an independent radio station run by the Catholic Church), hundreds of thousands of people surrounded the rebel troops to protect them with their own bodies. Following the spirit of creativity, people sold peanuts and souvenirs; singing and cheering mixed with dancing; there were spontaneous street masses, prayer vigils, rallies, and processions. Troops sent to attack the rebels were invited by singing and dancing protestors to join the revolution; airborne troops sent to bomb the rebels saw the mass of people surrounding them and defected. This revolution-cum-carnival culminated with a fascinating show-down:

Marcos has a plan: “We’ll bide our time, but we’ll disperse the civilians, protects them, take care of them, and then we’ll hit Enrile and Ramos.” He sends Marines, tanks and armored personnel carriers to attack Camp Crame [where the Defense Ministry headquarters were].

Marcos’ soldiers and weapons are met in the streets by tens of thousands of ordinary Filipinos who are surrounding Camp Crame to protect the rebel officers.

As the tanks start forward into the crowd, people sit down in front of them.

The tanks stop.
People offer the soldiers candy and cigarettes, asking them to defect and join the rebellion. Young girls walk among the soldiers, passing out flowers.

The blocked tanks start forward again. The people sit tight, holding their ground.

The tanks stop again.

A Marine commander threatens to start shooting. Priests and nuns kneel before the tanks, praying the Rosary. No shots are fired. Finally the tanks turn around and withdraw as the crowd cheers. (VanHise, “People Power”)

Over the next few days, Marcos and his regime was brushed aside by the Filipinos⁴, and the Reagan White House (one of Marcos’ supporters) was openly calling for him to resign. Around 9pm on 25 February 1986, Marcos and his family fled the country on a U.S. Air Force plane headed for Guam.

During the conflict, at one point a military man commented, “This is something new. Soldiers are supposed to protect the civilians. In this particular case, you have civilians protecting the soldiers.” Had the tanks been met with gunfire, they would have been sure to fire back in response, resulting in a violent conflagration where the side with the most bullets would have won. As it was, the challenge of violence was met and surpassed by the challenge of nonviolence, as the people defeated the tanks at Manila with zero bullets and zero conflagrations; the cycle of violence was not merely escalated, and chaos did not reign. The nonviolent logistics were a hurdle, but no amount of logistics could have overthrown Marcos’ regime violently with fewer casualties. When nonviolent methods are applied with the same devotion as violent methods, the soldiers are indeed the ones whose weapons become impotent, who need to be defended by the young girls passing out flowers and the priests with rosaries.

((References: Deats, VanHise “People Power”))

⁴ A dusk to dawn curfew is ignored; rebels take over a government-run TV station and cut off a Marcos speech in mid-sentence; loyalist soldiers are “defeated” by citizens kindly offering them McDonalds hamburgers, doughnuts and orange soda; his own inauguration, held at the same time as Aquino’s, is attended only by family members and a few paid guests; and so on.
Viet Nam

Especially in the wake of the recent wave of protests against the war in Iraq, we are reminded of the type of protesting which occurred locally in the United States during the war in Viet Nam. Civil disobedience, mass demonstrations, urban uprisings, and draft dodging abounded. But this was not the full story of the nonviolent resistance to the war, not by any means; much of the rejection of violence was found at the core of the violent war, with the American military in Viet Nam, the GIs themselves.

One of the most valuable tools for nonviolent resistance efforts is a good system of information transmission, since nonviolence’s first task is often to challenge common perceptions of the reality of situations. Here, uncensored news was circulated through underground networks within the military ranks. One of these papers, “Vietnam GI, a national paper with a circulation of 10,000 – most of it in Vietnam itself – carried stories of technicians sabotaging bombs, exposed Nixon’s peace initiatives as the fraud they were, and interviewed soldiers about their experiences in ‘the Nam’.”

Tensions were already high; (middle- and upper-class) officers would often seek promotions by putting their (lower-class) men into deadly situations, and the soldiers began to realize that they were defending a police-dictatorship that the Vietnamese did not want to defend. After the 1968 Tet offensive, tensions exploded. Mutinies became so common, spreading to entire companies at a time, that the army tried to disguise its frequency by calling it “combat refusal.” Some soldiers resented their officers even more strongly, and it is theorized that 20 to 25 percent of all officers killed in the war were killed by their own men who “fragged” them for their behavior (so named because of the use of fragmentation weapons such as grenades). In fact, the Pentagon estimates that 500,000 soldiers either went absent without leave (AWOL) or outright deserted – all despite the danger of being accused of treason, a charge which could
potentially be punishable with a firing squad. Soldiers began rebelling against the “search and destroy” missions by turning them into “search and avoid” missions, as patrols would deliberately avoid contact with the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), night patrols would stop just barely outside of camp, or patrols would find a safe spot in the jungle and simply stay put. This led to the NLF and NVA orders to not fire on GIs wearing red bandanas and peace signs unless the GIs fired first. By 1970, reactions such as these had brought the GI combat death toll down 70 percent from the 1968 peak. By 1975, civilian uproar and GI resistance (plus governmental scandals) had prevented enough of the United States’ attempted conquest that the U.S. finally ended its deployment of troops in Viet Nam.

The use of violence among the U.S. civilians and the GI soldiers in protest of the war makes this a less clear-cut case of nonviolent revolution, but the case is there nonetheless. As Nelson Mandela points out in reference to his own decisions and actions in South Africa, “Violence and nonviolence are not mutually exclusive; it is the predominance of the one or the other that labels a struggle.” A largely violent revolution with a few contingents who refuse to fire guns can still be deemed a violent revolution; likewise, a largely nonviolent revolution with a few contingents who fired on their own officers can still be deemed a nonviolent revolution. It is the predominance and overwhelming aim of one or the other that determines the designation of the movement. Looked at another way, the “fragging” could have been dropped entirely, and the other means of protest would have still carried the movement; however, if the “combat refusals,” the underground newspapers, the “search and avoid” patrols, and all the other nonviolent uprisings would have never occurred, the violent “fragging” protests would not have been sufficient to alter the United States’ position or actions in the war. The nonviolent dynamics are the aspects which carried the movement and provided the force for change.

((References: Mandela, Sacks, “Viet Nam”))
Palestine

One of most tangled conflicts in current politics is the Middle East's Israeli-Palestinian conflict, involving religion, history, memories of a Holocaust, culture, land ownership, and more. As with the previous example (Viet Nam), this situation is complicated by simultaneous (and mixed) strains of violent and nonviolent resistance to Israel's occupation of Palestine. Palestinians are often viewed in an extremely racist manner, as evidenced by United States House majority leader Tom DeLay in the summer of 2003:

“I'm sure there are some in the administration who are smarter than me, but I can't imagine in the very near future that a Palestinian state could ever happen. ... I can't imagine this president supporting a state of terrorists, a sovereign state of terrorists.” (Firestone)

However, there have indeed been distinct Palestinian voices and large-scale acts of nonviolent response; these have often dominated the movement, despite the presence of the minority who still turned to violence.

From the creation of modern-day Israel, Palestinians attempted to get their homes and land back nonviolently:

In 1948, these Palestinian refugees did not immediately take up arms against Israel when they were forcefully evicted from their homes. Just the opposite.

From 1948 up until the mid-1960s, Palestinians attempted to find a peaceful resolution to their being forced from their homes by the Israeli military. Through numerous political and organizational venues, Palestinians shuttled from the United States to the United Nations to Britain and back again, demanding that justice be served. Everyone recognized the historical injustice committed against the Palestinians, but no one stood up to take action. It was only then that the Palestinians took up arms and began their military struggle. For this they paid a high price. (Bahour)

Just after this time span, the Six Day War (4 June 1967) was the consequence of the abandonment of nonviolence, resulting in Israel occupying Gaza, the West Bank, and East
Jerusalem, thus creating even more oppressed and/or homeless Palestinian refugees. In the early 1980s, nonviolence was attempted again,

only to have the leaders of that nascent movement exiled from the West Bank. Many others - writers, student activists, unionists, musicians and organizers -- that tried to work nonviolently to end the occupation and restore the rights of the refugees were thrown in Israeli prisons. Most of them were tortured. (Bahour)

During the mid-1980s, Mubarak Awad (an American-educated Palestinian with a doctorate in counseling) nurtured nonviolent resistance groups, including actions such as reconciliation with Israeli Jews and direct action against the Israeli occupation; in June 1988, he was expelled by Yitzak Shamir’s Likud government, which is opposed to a Palestinian state. “Perhaps Shamir feared that [their] nonviolence was the most likely way for the Palestinians to achieve their dream of statehood” (Jezer).

Then, from 1987-1993, the first intifada (Arabic for “throwing off”) was organized by leaders and civilians across Palestine, in a mostly nonviolent grassroots movement comparable to the Southern Freedom movement in the United States. In this intifada, “weapons played no role and stones represented mere symbolic violence, and the fight against the devil, according to pilgrimage traditions in Islam that give the stone sacred meaning” (Baker). Leaders of this nonviolent movement were attacked as well³, children throwing token stones were met with automatic machine guns, and many who tried to insist on their humanity (by trying to save their homes, attempting to go to their fields to work, trying to visit family members, etc.) were killed.

Despite the brutal response to their nonviolent attempts, the end of this intifada saw the return of the Israeli Labor Party to power (after a decade and a half) and the attempt of steps toward peace in Madrid and Oslo.

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³ For instance, Mustapha Barghouti (director of the Health Development, Information and Policy Institute in Ramallah) was arrested, abused, jailed, and deported to Jordan, despite (or due to?) his nonviolent leadership.
But shortly, extremists came forward on both sides of the conflict, and relations regressed; over the next eight years, there was a 70 percent increase in the number of illegal Israeli settlers on Palestinian land and Israeli dominated Palestine’s economic development. In the second intifada, the same cycle occurred:

...events moved in the direction of popular action for a few weeks, away from weapons, and the intifada reaped tremendous results that culminated in the Clinton initiative, which surpasses the current road map in all aspects. At the beginning of 2001, and because of the failure of both parties to seize the opportunity offered by the Clinton initiative, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have taken significant control over the course of the intifada, and the Likud Party reached the top of the political pyramid on the other side, starting a journey of violence that eventually reached a dead end. (Baker)

Again nonviolent attempts made great strides, progress was not properly solidified, and violent extremists on both sides took the focus off of the nonviolent movement. In 2001, Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) protested against the militarization of the intifada by refraining from political activity for months on end, and in July he reached an agreement with Abu Ammar (Yasser Arafat) to attempt to put a stop to everything. Many steps were taken to stem the tide of violence, such as the following advertisement placed by leading Palestinians (possibly in the Jerusalem daily newspaper Al Quds, among other locations):

We, the undersigned, Palestinians from various political, intellectual and social institutions, united in our endurance and struggle for freedom, emphatically condemn and denounce Israel's blatant aggression on our people. The cold-blooded murder of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and his faithful companions by Sharon and his right-wing extremist government two days ago epitomizes Israel's criminal and insidious behavior.

While we assert our people's rights, guaranteed by all international covenants, to defend themselves by all means available and despite the enormity of our pain at this horrific tragedy and its impact, we nevertheless call upon our people throughout Palestine, guided by the imperatives of national interest and the removal of the initiative from the hands of the criminal occupation gang, to repress their rage and rise once again in a widespread, popular
and peaceful Intifada, based on clear objectives and forthright discourse, with the fate of our people steered by the masses.

Such an Intifada would be conducted by our valiant people as a proactive approach to deny Sharon the pretext to continue escalating his aggression on our people and holy sites and would prevent him from finalizing his “security” plot.

We call for this unified Intifada as a step towards the resurrection of constructive and disciplined popular action, with clear objectives as well as a binding program and political return. We reaffirm our commitment to our just and legal demands and to our people’s inalienable rights. We call for uniting ranks on grounds of national unity and a unified leadership that can effectively resist the occupation. (Al-Muhajabah)

“In a recent survey of 600 Palestinians by the international peace organization Search for Common Ground, 80 percent of respondents said they would support a large-scale civil-disobedience movement” (Kintisch). Recent protests in the West Bank have been nonviolent on a large scale: whole cities openly disobeying curfews with candlelight vigils, pot banging, nighttime parades. There are also groups like the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), consisting of Palestinian and international activists, who are active in nonviolently resisting, and raising awareness of, the Israeli occupation. Such actions include helping ambulances and food get through to sick Palestinians behind roadblocks or under curfew, escorting Palestinian children to school past soldier harassment, attempting to protect and rebuild demolished homes, and far more. Historically, Palestinians have also employed school and commercial strikes, protest advertisements and condemnations in the daily papers, and boycotts of Israeli goods.

Something which should be noted here is that advocating for nonviolent resistance does not imply that the Palestinians (or other defenders) do not have the right of armed resistance; rather, the point is that nonviolent resistance will bring greater progress and less destruction. Mubarak Awad offers an analysis of the Israeli military forces which applies in a far more general case beyond this specific conflict: “The Israelis know well how to fight an armed antagonist, yet they have little understanding of how to deal with massive nonviolent resistance. They expect and, in
fact, need for Palestinians to be either submissive or violent.” Part of the reason for this are the consciences of Israelis themselves, that “despite the various official announcements of Hamas etc, the Israelis really do try to avoid innocent casualties, or pretend to themselves that they do” (Brian). Nonviolent resistance movements remove this ability to pretend by painting the picture in much starker contrast than any conflict comprised of violence versus violence can. This Israeli public is “willing, more than in the past, to agree to a Palestinian state and the dismantling of settlements” (Rubinstein); the primary obstacle is that the public is unwilling to make concessions or take risks when they feel at risk from Palestinians. Nonviolent resistance is the best way to turn the question back upon the aggressor who feels justified; delusions of “They hit me first!” become the guilt of “They aren’t hitting me at all,” in the eyes of the aggressor and of the international community. In this manner, support is garnered and justifications are destroyed, as indications show that a full-fledged, unabashed focus on Palestinian nonviolence would bring much progress, despite the Israeli government’s attempts to remove the nonviolent leaders and impede the movement’s growth. The fact that the Israeli government feels compelled to remove the nonviolent leaders belies the government’s fear that such a movement would take hold and bring changes; they would prefer assassinations, deportations, and missile strikes over the danger of allowing the power of a nonviolent revolution to occur.

(References: Al-Muhajabah, Awad, Bahour, Baker, Barlow, Brian, Edelstein, Jezer, Kintisch, Muzher)

**South & Latin America**

Nonviolence has, to varying extents from token to full, been an element in many revolutions and struggles throughout the world. Strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience are often assumed to be inherently “greedy” or “violent” by detractors, but such methods have been
used as very pragmatic and principled efforts. For example, in South Africa in 1948, Dr Malan's Nationalist Party was elected by the 20 percent of South Africans who were legally "white" and therefore able to vote; this party subsequently established Apartheid policies and vigorously enacted vicious and brutal laws of repression. In response, the African National Congress (ANC) pursued civil disobedience in a manner that was implicitly nonviolent and explicitly disciplined and controlled:

Responding to this new challenge, the ANC adopted in 1949 a "programme of action" that stipulated that boycotts, strikes, non-collaboration, and "civil disobedience" would now be used as methods and forms of action in the political struggle. The programme contemplated participation by the masses of the people. It did not raise the question of violence versus nonviolence. The appearance of the word "nonviolence" in the political vocabulary of the ANC was a product of the objective conditions under which the programme was being put into action. The use of the expression "civil disobedience" in the programme was, however, of significance. ... But the programme of action did not define "civil disobedience." Did it mean civil disorder? Mob violence? Rioting? It most certainly did not mean any of these types of conduct. The keynote of the disobedience was to be discipline. The expression "civil disobedience" referred to the deliberate breach, or defiance, of government laws, regulations, and orders. The conference, in interpreting civil disobedience in terms of disciplined and purposeful mass action, emphasised nonviolence. It called for self-control on the part of the people and urged them to withstand acts of provocation by the police, who were obviously anxious for a showdown. Failure to emphasise the need for discipline would have been a fatal political blunder. Nonviolence was thus a political tactic that could be changed according to the demands of the political situation at any given time. (Davis, emphasis added)

Disciplined boycotts and strikes were used heavily in the nonviolent revolutions of South and Latin America between 1931 and 1961, in the form of "civic strikes," defined by Patricia Parkman as "the collective suspension of normal activities by people of diverse social groups united by a common political objective" (1).
During this 30-year timespan, these movements pushed eleven South and Latin American presidents out of office – Carlos Ibáñez del Campo of Chile (1931); Gerardo Machado of Cuba (1933); Maximiliano Hernández Martínez of El Salvador (1944); Jorge Ubico of Guatemala (1944); Elie Lescot of Haiti (1946); Arnulfo Arias of Panama (1951); Paul Magloire, Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis, and Frank Sylvain of Haiti (1956 and 1957); Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of Colombia (1957); and Joaquín Balaguer of the Dominican Republic (1962) – and attempted unsuccessfully to push out at least four more – Juan de Dios Martínez Mera of Ecuador (1933); Carlos Mendieta of Cuba (1935); Tiburcio Carías Andino of Honduras (1944); and Anastasio Somoza García of Nicaragua (1944). Most of the regimes were characterized by repression, usually with spy systems or secret police, prohibition of labor unions and/or strikes, extended states of martial law, paralyzation/imprisonment/exile of political opposition, and no free press. Ten of the fifteen rulers were dictators for all or part of their time in power⁶, and the people feared that three of the other five would result in dictatorial rule. Most had the military (or at least a strong military contingent) supporting their reign; though in one case (Cuba in 1935) the revolution was directed not against President Mendieta, but against armed forces chief Fulgencio Batista who controlled a de facto military dictatorship in the country. The common thread is that these were powerful men who ruled with strong violence (both in threats and in practice) against the people.

To stand a chance at nonviolent resistance, as with violent resistance, power is needed. With violence, this power is attainable by producing large enough explosions or flinging enough metal into unwanted opponents. With nonviolence, however, this power is attainable by amassing enough people to stand together in solidarity. As Davis outlined above, the goal of the ANC in South Africa was “participation by the masses of the people.” However, where South

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⁶ Ibáñez, Machado, Martínez, Ubico, Lescot, Arias, Magloire, and Rojas Pinilla
Africa has Nelson Mandela and Bishop Desmond Tutu as figureheads around which to rally, the
South and Latin American revolutions had a spread-out leadership with no charismatic leaders,
and much of the leadership is nameless in the records. Additionally, as noted in the Viet Nam
discussion (and should also be applied to the Palestine and South Africa cases, as well as most
nonviolent movements in general), the presence of violence does not invalidate the nonviolent
classification of the power which was applied. Parkman notes,

...while violent incidents occurred in the course of most of these uprisings, “generalized
violence” occurred in fewer than half and was alien to their essential character. Rather, the
rapid buildup of popular pressure for the removal of the president took the form of walkouts
and shutdowns (usually accompanied by demonstrations and/or petitions) designed to
dramatize public disapproval and threaten the regime’s capacity to function. (3)
The primary thrust was in the nonviolent strikes, walkouts, shutdowns, demonstrations, and
petitions — in the drama and the withholding of cooperation.

For withholding cooperation, everyone in society can take part. People from all parties
banded together to resist; for instance, Chile’s revolution against Ibáñez included Communists,
leftists, elements of the Liberal Party, Democrats, a few Radicals, many Conservatives,
independents, and even the Nazi-fascist movement. Though each element of the movements was
hoping for a different follow-up outcome, they all united in the goal of removing the president.
People from all classes banded together to resist, too. Some countries saw upper-sector
opposition movements (member of local oligarchies, stockbrokers, school teachers, bankers,
mulatto elite); some countries saw middle-sector opposition movements (physicians, lawyers,
accountants, engineers, architects, the press, the urban community); a majority of the countries
saw lower-sector opposition movements (unions, bus/streetcar operators, railroad workers, dock
workers, butchers, bakers, barbers); and all of the countries saw key participation by students and
youth. In Panama, students, housewives, and union members joined to organize the
demonstrations which started the civic strikes; women organized a large number of processions in Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, and played a key role in organizing the strikes in El Salvador and Guatemala; and women and children probably marched in El Salvador even before the students went on strike. Large numbers of professional people (the professions varied depending on the character of the specific cities) went on strike, sometimes with their employers’ support in “paying their own employees for the enforced vacations” and “contributing to the expenses of the movement” (Parkman 10). Such action by any element of society is damaging to the smooth flow of the government, even a military dictatorship; especially in poorer countries where nobody has extraneous jobs and the government relies upon the cooperation of everyone in society. The power of these nonviolent refusals to work crippled government functions in many cases.

For the aspect of drama, fellow citizens and their own governmental forces were the usual audience, rather than attracting international eyes and ears to gain sympathy and external sanctions. In fact, the international support in many of the South and Latin American cases was support of the dictators themselves, from the United States. Drama was often heavily symbolic, as here:

In Chile, the students who began the insurrection against Ibáñez staged a symbolic armed confrontation with the police by defending the university building they occupied until they ran out of ammunition. In the words of H. Ochoa Mena, a participant in the subsequent strike, the siege of the university was “ridiculous” as a military action. It was a dangerous piece of theater which captured the imagination of the inhabitants of Santiago precisely because it brought such unequal forces into play, and thereby served to raise the flag of revolt. (Parkman 13)

This was clearly a creative act designed to poignantly display the disparity of power, not a hope to actually resist violently. The drama inspired fellow citizens in the subsequent strikes, and put pressure upon the people in power to rethink their loyalties. As noted before, nonviolence is
acutely suited to such drama, often drawing a sharply clear picture of the dynamics of the occurring conflict. Many of the protest organizers understood this well, and much of the literature and statements promoting various strikes bears explicit devotion to this mindset of nonviolent resistance. (Note the similarity between these and the Palestinian newspaper advertisement earlier.)

**Colombian joint Conservative/Liberal radio broadcast:**

We ask that the movement maintain itself in peace as a legitimate resistance ... without offering a target for bullets. Even the murders which are being committed must not make us lose our heads. We reject the violence which is used on us and we do not want any of our people to use it. The effectiveness of the action of the Colombian people against a government which oppresses it by force lies solely in its moral resistance. (Parkman 14)

Opposition members and leaders in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador often requested supporters to stay off the streets during civic strikes (to minimize the potential for clashes and eruptions of violence) and intervened to calm angry crowds. Their attitude was one of being distinctly different in kind from the violent oppressors. Even Che Guevara, a later (violent) Cuban revolutionary against Fulgencia Batista, held this distinction. When his men wanted to execute a Batista soldier in retaliation for the death of a dear comrade, Guevara forbade it: “Do you think we’re like them?” (Taylor 118)

In the sizable body of nonviolent revolutions in South and Latin America, we see the focus of these people in the dramatic, pragmatic aim of their nonviolence. Jonathan Schell offers a good analysis of this type of civilian revolution in general, an analysis which is pertinent and highly applicable to the South and Latin American nonviolence:

… [T]he tangible effect upon hearts and minds was paramount, and the tangible effect upon the opposing military forces was secondary. … [W]e seem to see the human will detaching itself from physical fighting, as if getting ready to make a break and turn to other means… [T]he capacity of force to decide political issues is thrown into doubt. (Schell, “Unconquerable” 97-98)
When the nonviolent aspects of revolutions are the powerful aspects, and the violent aspects are more easily dismissed and met by the oppressive forces, we are indeed forced to doubt the capacity of force to decide political issues. The body of counter-evidence is growing steadily, allowing deeper and better insights into the nature of nonviolent power; most of these insights (often the best and most poignant) come, naturally, from the nonviolent revolutionaries themselves. Enmeshed in the conflict, they are living the question of whether to use violence or nonviolence – and the answer that works, the answer that is more human, is being understood as the nonviolent one.

(References: Davis, Parkman, Seidman)

**Eastern Europe**

At this point, many critics of nonviolence are still left with their catch-all challenge: “But what about Hitler?” A good response is, “Yes, let’s talk about Hitler; what about him?” Was Hitler resisted nonviolently, and if so was it done successfully? Some will claim that the very existence of World War II is *de facto* evidence that nonviolence did not work in the resistance against the Nazis. However, what needs to be studied instead is whether nonviolent resistance was used *anywhere* successfully against them, even if it was not adopted by the Allies. For if nonviolence was indeed useful against the Nazis, then the only question left for the large-scale approach is (as earlier) one of logistics, not of nature.

Before we look at some of the nonviolent resistance against Hitler during WWII, let us address the issue of *whose* resistance we need. The closer nonviolent resistance is to the source, the better it can work. Consider our own country’s experience of the Southern Freedom movement. It is very doubtful that such strides against racism could have been effected by an outside country, either by violent or nonviolent means – yet the internal nonviolent resistance
made (and in some areas is continuing to make) such strides. So before Hitler even started accumulating or using his power against other countries, he could have been stopped nonviolently by Germans of conscience.

Had German industrialists not financed Hitler's rise to power; had German youths refused to serve in the military; had conservatives not supported him and communists deluded themselves that anything would be better than the liberal democratic Weimar regime, Hitler might have remained the frustrated and ineffectual architect he was and very nearly remained. … Despite the strong-arm methods and street violence we usually associate with the Nazis, Hitler worked primarily through legal institutional channels, and his future hung precariously in the balance more than once. Compared with what it took to stop him years later when he had consolidated his position, he could easily have been denied power in the first place by concerted nonviolent (particularly political) action. (Holmes)

To criticize nonviolence for not working “after it’s too late” is to ignore the obvious counterpoint that violence works best earlier in the game as well, plus the point that, in many situations, nonviolence continues to be applicable in situations where violence ceases to be feasible as a viable option.

Now, rather than the possible intra-country nonviolent resistance model (akin to the South and Latin American revolutions) addressed above, we will consider one of the actual cases of inter-country nonviolent resistance to Germany: Denmark.

**Denmark**

After gaining power, Adolf Hitler led the German troops to invade Czechoslovakia (March 1939) and Poland (1 September 1939). For the strategic reason of gaining control of the mostly-neutral Scandinavian region (apart from Finland), Hitler then gave the order to invade Denmark and Norway on 9 April 2004. Hitler did not want war with or management of Denmark; he just wanted to use its strategic position and agricultural and industrial proceeds to fund his war effort in general. He sent a message (via a German diplomat) to the Danish Foreign Minister, telling
them to “co-operate and keep political independence, resist and lose everything – ‘the bombers are even now on their way’”; the Danish government quickly agreed to accept German military occupation.

Though the occupation was “accepted,” this does not mean that it was endorsed or liked – it only means that it was not rejected in the government’s answer to Hitler’s “check yes or no” proposal. For a time, renewed national enthusiasm gave the Danes the solidarity and patience to tolerate the “policy of negotiation,” in return for a more normal life insulated from the violence. However, this perceived (and somewhat delusional) “insulation” was short-lived; in November 1941 Germany threatened Denmark to side with them against the Soviet Union “or else.” Freedom of the press was soon revoked, and the press responded by protesting and disobeying in many creative ways – e.g., newspapers would print Danish news and German official reports side by side without comment, letting readers recognize the German propaganda tricks for themselves; radio broadcasters would read German items in scornful or incredulous tones of voice; and many underground publications sprang up as well (538 of them, 24 million total copies, by 1945). King Christian X took daily horseback rides through the streets of Copenhagen, helping to motivate and solidify the resistance.

Militant minorities began to grow restless, but the Danish army and navy maintained their stance of “no fighting.” Hitler feared a violent resistance anyway, and determined that Denmark should be treated not as a friendly co-operative country but as a hostile province. In January 1943, the Allied attacks came to Denmark (killing some civilians in the process), and the Danish underground decided to begin nonviolent sabotage of buildings and transport, involving subtle slowing of work and production, open cessation of work (strikes), quiet destruction of machinery, and more. Heavy repercussions came down from the German Nazi overseer, including total curfews and the death penalty for saboteurs. Full-fledged occupation began on 29
August 1943, with the following events: Gestapo arrests of influential civil servants, academics, and others; German attacks upon the Danish army and navy; a mass resignation of the Danish government which resulted in full military occupation by the Germans. Martial law took over without carnage, but the Danes were not finished yet.

When Denmark’s 8,000-plus Jews began to be targeted for arrests and deportation on the night of 1 October 1943 (the start of the Jewish New Year “Rosh Hashanah”), a German shipping expert and diplomat spread the news discreetly three days beforehand (28 September). Across the nation, Jews were smuggled away from the Nazi forces in nonviolent rescue operations – hidden in houses, disguised as hospital patients with new names and imaginary illnesses, sent by boats to Sweden. Denmark was the only country is occupied Europe which accomplished the feat of saving the lives of a majority of its Jewish population. “In all, 7,220 Jews were helped to reach Sweden safely. In the raids on October 1 and 2, only 284 were captured; 275 were caught later, but 85 of those were released” (“World War Two”, emphasis added).

A leading Danish pacifist said, “The government had the good sense to give instructions not to mobilize our army. We can’t thank them enough for the courage they showed in this.” The restraint of violence and creativity of resistance is seen remarkably in Denmark’s example; violent measures were taken, however, and these were the actions which prompted greater violent reprisal. Though Danish army officers set up their own underground army after finally being released from prison, their goal was not violent resistance but rather protection of industry, transport systems and communications after the war. The civilian saboteurs were the ones who wanted to violently resist, and the Allied forces were only too pleased to provide them with great

7 “Troop units attacked Danish army garrisons and depots and the Danish navy’s main base; the officers and men were imprisoned. True to their orders not to fight, the Danish servicemen didn’t resist arrest (indeed, officers on leave at the time came home and, smartly uniformed, turned themselves in, together with baggage ready-packed with prison necessities). The navy had also had its instructions: ships that couldn’t escape to Sweden were scuttled by their own crews” (“World War Two”).
amounts of weaponry. This led directly to the cycle of violence which the Danish government “had the good sense” to avoid:

Shipyard workers in Copenhagen responded by going on strike; after the curfew hour, crowds massed on the streets, lighting fires and putting up barricades. German patrols hit back by killing 6 civilians; the strike spread. The Germans executed 9 imprisoned saboteurs; the demonstrations became more violent. Troops cut off Copenhagen’s power and water supplies, and blocked roads out of the city; street fighting intensified, and German artillery moved in. Complete catastrophe was finally averted by a politician acting as mediator. The German-sponsored ‘retaliation force’ was called off, patrols agreed not to shoot at civilians, and power supplies were restored. In return, the Danes went back to work. 23 had been killed and 203 wounded. (“World War Two”)

When viewed as a whole, it is sobering to see the bountiful and relatively casualty-free results of nonviolent resistance contrasted with the counter-productive and bloody violent resistance, both attempted within the same country and situation. The same Germans who “chose to look the other way” during the nonviolent rescue of the Jews were the ones who fired on civilians during the violent protests. Again, we see that nonviolence had a greater power when used against the German Nazis, and that it produced better and cleaner results as well.

A postwar historian summarized the defiance: “Denmark had not won the war but neither had it been defeated or destroyed. Most Danes had not been brutalized, by the Germans or by each other. Nonviolent resistance saved the country and contributed more to the Allied victory than Danish arms could ever have done.” (McCarthy)

(References: McCarthy, information and quotes primarily from “World War Two”)

Berlin

Even in 1943, at the height of World War II, in the capital of Hitler’s Third Reich, we have a prime case of nonviolent resistance. On the day when every Jew living in Germany was

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8 “Air drops from January 1944 to the end of the war delivered thousands of rocket-launchers, rifles, hand guns and ammunition, together with around 74,000 pounds of plastic explosives and detonating cord” (“World War Two”).
9 Similar results were obtained in Bulgaria, where “spontaneous civil resistance (including crowds sitting on train tracks) prevented the Nazis from shipping any Jews out of the country” (McReynolds).
arrested and taken to mass camps for holding, the Gestapo was mobilizing everywhere; covered trucks with armed Nazi Secret Service escorts were collecting Jews from factories and private homes, taking them to camps and prisons. In Berlin, the Jews with ‘Aryan kin’ were separated and taken to a prison in the Rosenstrasse for undisclosed reasons. One of the men who was arrested tells the story of what happened next:

“At this point the wives stepped in. Already by the early hours of the next day they had discovered the whereabouts of their husbands and as by common consent, as if they had been summoned, a crowd of them appeared at the gate of the improvised detention center. In vain the security police tried to turn away the demonstrators, some 6,000 of them, and to disperse them. Again and again they massed together, advanced, called for their husbands, who despite strict instructions to the contrary, showed themselves at the windows, and demanded their release.

“For a few hours the routine of a working day interrupted the demonstration, but in the afternoon the square was again crammed with people, and the demanding, accusing cries of the women rose above the noise of the traffic like passionate avowals of a love strengthened by the bitterness of life.

“Gestapo headquarters was situated in the Burgstrasse, not far from the square where the demonstration was taking place. A few salvoes from a machine gun could have wiped the women off the square, but the SS did not fire, not this time. Scared by an incident which had no equal in the history of the Third Reich, headquarters consented to negotiate. They spoke soothingly, gave assurances, and finally released the prisoners.” (Heinz Ullstein, quoted in Sharp 89-90)

Though records indicate this was the only large-scale protest of Nazi actions within Germany itself, it is not the only case of Nazi sensitivity to public opinion. Daniel Goldhagen (in Hitler’s Willing Executioners – Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust) cites protests and opposition to other policies (including religious oppression) which led to changes by the Nazis; for all their cruelty to the Jews, the Nazi regime had “thousands of agents” around the country who would gather public mood and opinion, and they would then follow policies based on what they thought
the people would support. Had German citizens chosen to support even less of Hitler's plan, even more violence could have been avoided nonviolently.

((References: Reimer))

The biggest problem of resistance to Hitler, as we see, seems to be – yet again – in logistics: in most of the countries, the majority of the people refused to act. The question of nonviolence is, "If people followed nonviolence, would it work?" What we are seeing is that when people groups follow it, it works more successfully and more consistently than violence. Violence relies less upon force and more upon acquiescence than people usually like to admit. Though there are many more cases which could be studied (both in World War II and elsewhere), a good conclusion and follow-up to Hitler is a study of the nonviolent resistance which recently brought down the Soviet Union, the Eastern European oppressor which succeeded Hitler.

One of the longest-running nonviolent resistances against the Soviet Union was Solidarity in Poland, the Eastern bloc’s first independent trade union. Originating with Lech Walesa on 22 September 1980, Solidarity ("Solidarnosc") found such great success through working with a group of intellectual dissidents\(^\text{10}\) and basing itself on the rules and methods of nonviolence. Some of their methods were organizing controlled strikes for specific ends, supporting families of imprisoned workers, offering legal and medical aid, and disseminating news through an underground network. On 13 December 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski (leader of the Polish government) declared martial law to confront Solidarity, declaring the movement illegal and arresting its leaders, though it continued underground even after being formally shut down by the

\(^{10}\) KOR or Komitet Obrony Robotnikow, a Workers' Defense Committee which was founded in 1976 and dissolved to join ranks with the Solidarity movement.
Sejm (Parliament) on 8 October 1982. Though martial law was lifted in July 1983, food rationing and heightened controls on civil liberties and political life continued throughout the 1980s. In 1988, nationwide strikes and labor unrest forced the government to open a dialogue with Solidarity, which was finally legalized in April 1989. In the next election, Solidarity-endorsed candidates “won 99 of 100 seats in the newly formed Senate (upper house) and all 161 seats (of 460 total) that opposition candidates were entitled to contest in the Sejm (lower house).”

((References: “Solidarity” Wikipedia and “Solidarity” Britannica))

Two other large-scale shifts were taking place during the 1980s as well: protests in Europe against the Reagan doctrine and the Reagan Defense Guidance Plan\(^{11}\) and a surge of ethno-nationalism in the various countries comprising the Soviet Union. Widespread international protests of Reagan’s highly militaristic approach to the Soviet Union included some impressive numbers:

In October 1981, 500,000 people demonstrated in the streets of Rome against deployment of these missiles; 300,000 in Bonn; 100,000 in Hamburg; 200,000 in Belgium; 500,000 in Madrid; 140,000 in Barcelona; and similar numbers in Denmark, England, and elsewhere. In 1982 a million people demonstrated in New York. The International Congress of Physicians Against Nuclear War was organized, and within a year grew to more than 70,000 members in forty-three countries. (Swomley)

Within the Soviet Union, the rise of ethno-nationalism and the desire for sovereignty and self-determination in the Baltics, Transcaucasus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan, were pioneering this movement and basing it on nonviolence, the Soviet constitution, and Soviet and international law. Only two of the Soviet countries, however, had the power to alone break apart the Soviet Union: Russia and Ukraine, “which together comprised 70 percent of the Soviet Union’s population and even more of its gross national product” (Laba). In Russia, Boris Yeltsin

\(^{11}\) The former called for a rollback of Communism, while the latter called for huge military budgets and war against the Soviets, beginning with the installation of intermediate-range missiles that could reach Moscow from Western Europe in six to eight minutes” (Swomley).
appealed to Russian ethno-nationalism in his bid for power against Gorbachev; this ended up encouraging many other countries to focus upon their own ethno-nationalism:

By late 1990, half of the 16 autonomous republics (Kareliya, Komi, Tatarstan, Udmur-tiya, Yakutiya, Buryatiya, Bashkortostan, and Kalmykiya) had ratified declarations of sovereignty. Even more submerged groups in the Soviet hierarchy of nations, such as the Adygei, the Chukot, the Koryak, and the Yamal-Nenets, which did not even have the status of autonomous republics, now declared sovereignty. (Laba)

While Yeltsin, once in power, correctly understood (as did Lenin) that repression breeds resentment, he failed to realize (or was unable to overcome the fact) that the damage had already been done; resentment and the desire for sovereignty was already too strong. On 26 August 1991, just as Yeltsin was gaining his power over Russia and the Soviet Union at large, the Ukrainian parliament voted 346 to 1 for independence; on 1 December 1991, the population voted overwhelmingly for the same. As Jonathan Schell observes, “The Soviet Union was a tremendous totalitarian state and empire. It had nuclear weapons, the Red Army, the KGB, all sorts of other agencies – they'd taken over every aspect of civil life. There has rarely been a state that has had more of the instruments of power in its hands” (Schell, “Power”). Yet the Soviet Union fell – through international protests, national votes, nonviolent nationalist protests (such as the Rukh separatist protest in Ukraine which forced the Republic’s Prime Minister to resign), draft refusals (from 92% in Georgia and 84% in Armenia to 19% in Moldova) – as people decided they wanted an end to the Cold War and an end to the Soviet Union.

((References: Laba, Spencer))

**Logistics, Creativity, Drama**

We see the intertwining threads of logistics, creativity, and drama in all of these examples, and there are many more cases which support these observations as well. All three of these
facets are necessary to nonviolent conflict, and each leans upon the other two. Logistics is a 
factor for violent advocates too, who must rely on “tens of thousands of well-trained and 
equipped persons willing to make the ultimate sacrifice in the service of the cause for which the 
action is undertaken; not to mention millions more in the society at large who are willing to 
support this effort financially and often through direct participation in the maintenance of the 
machinery necessary to war” (Holmes). When nonviolence gets the same devotion, as we see 
repeatedly in the examples above, it proves to be an amazingly successful means of resisting 
oppression and engaging conflict. In fact, nonviolence often tilts the balance of power in 
disproportionate struggles in the opposite direction: “Violence is a method by which the ruthless 
few can subdue the passive many. Nonviolence is a means by which the active many can 
overcome the ruthless few” (Schell, “Unconquerable” 144). In the realm of logistics, 
nonviolence requires the same support that violence does, yet has greater potential for turning 
that support into better and more solid results.

Creativity is an often-ignored factor in violent conflict, where the standard logic is simply 
that the bigger gun wins. But in nonviolent conflict, creativity is itself one of the best weapons, 
to be able to tailor every nonviolent response to the specific needs and minutiae of the problem. 
“The nonviolent actor exhibits the highest degree of freedom also because his action originates 
within himself, according to his own judgment, inclination, and conscience, not in helpless, 
automatic response to something done by someone else. He is thus a creator, not a mere 
responder” (Schell, “Unconquerable” 133). Czechoslovakia offers some perfect examples (from 
the 1968 invasion by the Soviet Union) of infusing protests with creativity:

* The Lost Train – The Czechoslovakians discovered that a Russian freight train was 
transporting equipment to jam pirate radio broadcasts. A radio station put out an appeal for 
rail workers to stop the train. It never made it to Prague. First the train was delayed when

28
the electricity failed, then it ended up on a side track stuck between two other immobilized locomotives. The Soviets eventually had to transport the gear by helicopter.

* Nude Pictures – In Bratislava a group of young people gathered up boxes of “girlie” magazines that had recently become available from the West. They went to a park and handed them out to the lonely Soviet tank crews that were keeping watch over the area. After a while the commander realized what was happening and ordered his men back into their tanks. ... With the soldiers sealed inside their tanks, the kids then stuck paper over their periscopes, making it impossible for the Soviets to continue their surveillance.

* Lost in Czechoslovakia – Traveling in Czechoslovakia was a nightmare for the ... troops. The Czechs had removed street signs and painted over building address numbers. Many small villages renamed themselves “Dubcek” or “Svoboda.” In rural areas it was not uncommon to see a troop convoy stalled at a crossroad, the commander scratching his head over an open map.

(VanHise, “Civilian”)

The people responded to the invasion with determined nonviolence and creative, effective resistance. Actions such as organizing large-scale protests and removing street signs creates greater problems for an oppressing power than do most attempts at violent resistance, and almost invariably costs far less bloodshed on both sides. Nonviolent campaigns often convert previously uncommitted third party members to their side, and even pull support from the ranks of former opposition members – opposition members who would be far less inclined to defect to join a resistance which was killing their colleagues.

This leads directly to the third factor, that of drama. As noted throughout this essay, drama can be used with symbolic violence or instigated conflicts, demonstrations and public protests, and especially media attention. The goal of drama is often to simplify the conflict, to draw a clearer distinction between the oppressor and the oppressed. The frequent defection of former opposition members owes much of its frequency to dramatic action which touched the consciences of the aggressors – or at least made them worry about public or international opinion.
As Hannah Arendt observes, “Violence can destroy power” (quoted in Schell, “Power”). Nonviolence, on the other hand, can create power out of apparent nothingness. On every (inhabited) continent, people have turned to nonviolence in conflict – some out of pragmatic necessity, some because of principles – and have consistently been shocked by the level of response, of fellow citizens joining in and of oppressive opponents giving ground. Violence has failed to prove itself a viable option for conflict resolution, and is in fact becoming less viable every year, as modern weaponry becomes more and more destructive and “sanitary” for the attackers. Nonviolence is showing itself to be the better model of conflict resolution, one supporting infinitely greater nuance, insight, and productivity. Like most conflicting scientific models, there will continue to be adherents to both violence and nonviolence, with each side trying to develop their own arguments and support. But increasingly, even proponents of violence are coming to recognize that the empirical evidence is not on their side, though many still attempt to salvage some use from violence rather than truly consider or pursue the alternative. When the cases of nonviolent resistance are studied, and the facets of nonviolent resistance are properly recognized and understood, the conclusion becomes inescapable that this may well be humanity’s only way to stop the destructive cycles of violence which are threatening to tear our world apart.
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