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Why Violence is Not the Answer:

*A Comparison of Opposition Groups from the US Civil Rights and Anti-Apartheid
Movements*

Department Honors Thesis

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Abstract

Political discontent is present within all societies. Although the circumstances surrounding the formation of a specific movement and its principles may differ, the goals of various political movements are the same. In order to bring about a favorable response in policy from the government, these resistance organizations may choose tactics of violence or non-violence as a means to lobby the government in control. Ability to manipulate the media, gain a strong base of membership within society and produce change from the government serves as a composite measure of effectiveness for each individual resistance group. Using qualitative evidence from organizations from the U.S. Civil Rights Movement and the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement, a non-violent and violent organization was analyzed from each movement. While there are benefits and drawbacks to both approaches, non-violent tactics appear to be consistently more effective at securing change than violent factions.

Two Cases

Scenes of police brutality etched into minds throughout the world. Government operated tanks opened fire on students and children in the streets of South Africa. City policemen unleash ferocious dogs and high powered hoses on peaceful protestors in cities throughout the United States. These two situations, remarkably similar have long lasting effects on the history of the world. These scenes of blatant brutality seem out of the ordinary. The western world would never condone such unfair and arbitrary practices in their governments. It is widely understood that governments cannot use unnecessary force to suppress opposing ideas. Even in non-democratic societies, these forms of oppression are indicative of tyrannical governments.

Tyranny and dictatorship, and oppressive elites, are rarely considered the ideal forms of government. Aristotle, in his seminal work, *The Politics*, discusses the important role of citizens. Since citizens do not take an active role in oligarchic societies with rule of a few or in tyrannical and dictatorial societies with strong leaders, Aristotle disregards these forms of government as advantageous. Autocratic governments risk the increased chance for corruption and citizen neglect (Aristotle, 1981, pp. 315-317). These images indicated an imperfect government, something was wrong in both of these scenarios. The government was not acting responsibly or

fairly to its people. Violent oppression and violent actions were becoming more and more prevalent during these times. The world looked up and took notice. The world would not condone these practices. An outcry gradually arose. Things needed to change.

There are many parallels between the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and the Civil Rights movement in America. In both cases, a large segment of the population was denied equal rights with the remainder of the population. The governments in control refused to grant these freedoms to minority populations. In both cases, these populations demanded rights and considerations equal to all members of society. In the United States, the glaring contradiction existed between the principle of equal rights for all expounded in the Declaration's revolutionary statement that, "all men are created equal," and the practice of separate facilities for members of different races despite the equal protection clause listed in the 14th Amendment. In South Africa, the majority colored population was severely oppressed by the elite minority population of white Afrikaners and those of Dutch and British heritage. Although in South Africa equality was not promised in its foundational documents like in the United States, both movements opposed the heinous legalized and institutionalized forms of oppression, bringing issues of political legitimacy and social contract theory into question. Did these groups have a legitimate right and responsibility to challenge the unfair system of government in place? Had both governments failed their constituents and broken the social contract?

Within both of these examples, the government violated the rights of segments of the population. In both countries, resistance movements formed to combat the injustices of the government. Two main approaches exist to combat injustice within society: non-violence and violence. Non-violent organizations are known for their civil disobedience and peaceful practices of protests. Violent organizations utilize more direct and militant practices, often operating

outside governmental institutions. Both types of movements face obstacles to success and enjoy benefits. However, a common goal exists for violent and non-violent movements alike: securing a change within society. In order to be effective, movements must draw a base of membership from society, generate media attention to publicize their cause, and ultimately create change from the government. Due to its ability to work within institutions of government, non-violent movements are more effective in accomplish the goals of change within the government and create greater justice within society.

Foundations of Democracy

John Locke's political theories stand as one of the foremost understandings of social contract theory in a democratic framework: the nature of the relationship between governments and the governed. Locke's theories of social contract outline the unique relationship between the government and its constituents. A government is formed by the consent of a population. In this circumstance, individuals choose to surrender certain individual rights in order to secure a body of collective rights guaranteed by the government in power. However, the unique nature of a social contract states that a government that does not provide basic protections for the people can be rightfully overthrown by the people. Once a contract is broken by the government, individuals may dissolve the government and form a new government in its place (Locke, 1821, pp. 259-261). In this theory, the government is responsible to the people and derives its legitimacy and ability to govern from the consent of the governed. If the government violates this relationship, the governed are permitted to take action. This theory has become one basis for understanding the relationships between governments and the people, especially in democratic states.

Social contract theory establishes the principle of legitimacy as a necessary component of a government in power. Many times oppressed populations spend countless years struggling

for the freedoms and rights that are guaranteed them. It is no surprise that under a tyrannical and oppressive government that violent factions will rise up in an attempt to overthrow it and secure for themselves a greater degree of freedom due to the loss of diffuse support. Social contract theory implies that the consent of the governed is required for the continued existence of the government. Without maintaining the support of the population, a government's legitimacy can be called into question and the population has the right and responsibility to overthrow the government and create a new one.

Need for Legitimacy

Since the structures of dominance are subject to abuse, governments require legitimacy in order to function effectively; this legitimacy serves as an internal check against abuses of power. States are ascribed power and allowed to use a form of "legitimate violence." This "violence" is not brutality, but rather the assertion of a role of dominance and forces of coercion that require the population to defer to its leaders (Weber, 1965, pp. 2-3). States by nature are formed to be hierarchical; one group or individual will dominate another. Therefore, legitimacy is a check on government power (pp. 4-6). Structures of dominance are inherent to states and although states should use their power legitimately, the infrastructure of governments and institutions easily lends itself to oppression. Governments must not be concerned with public opinion in each policy decision made, but there must be a level of support in order to allow the government to continue. David Easton's (1975) engagement of support outlines an understanding of support that extends beyond general attitudes. Behaviors are necessary to show the individual's support, or lack thereof; however, behaviors are unlikely to occur without the presence of attitudes to serve as a foundation. Specific support relates to the individual policies and practices of a government in power, often subject to change and fluctuation based on the sentiment of the public.

Diffuse support, however, applies to the institutions of government itself, rather than policies. This implies a faith in the governmental structure and system and its ability to accomplish its intended purpose, which is less likely to change over time because it is not subject to changes in elected officials, only to complete overhauls of governmental structures (pp. 435-37). Diffuse support, rather than specific support, is the lynchpin for the legitimacy of the government, allowing a government to make decisions without needing the constant complete approval of the masses. Instead, governments are free to act in potentially controversial ways without concern for immediate overthrow by a disgruntled population. Diffuse support allows extended stability for governmental regimes and even nation states as the government in power may change over time.

It is most beneficial for a government to possess both specific and diffuse support. While diffuse support allows for stability, specific support allows for a continual evaluation of the government and its policies (Easton, 1975, p. 437). Because of the relationship between specific and diffuse support, a single failed policy of the government will not result in the cessation of legitimacy. However, specific support, lost over time can result in the disappearance of legitimacy. Social groups that consider themselves losers from a specific policy cannot individually undermine the institutional legitimacy of a regime. But, if this pattern of mistreatment continues over time, it is likely that the political instability will increase and eventually continue to undermine the foundations of regime legitimacy (Hechter, 2009, p. 287). Support for government and legitimacy are necessary for governments to thrive and continue in their position of power. Continual neglect of a social group without a base of diffuse support will contribute to the political instability and sentiment present in a nation.

Definitions of Democracy

Democracy requires legitimacy in order to function effectively, regardless of the form the government may take. Although democratic principles can be applied to many different forms of government, certain principles, like legitimacy remain constant throughout systems. Broadly stated, democracy has several main components: accountability for those in control, competition among controlling forces, and the role of the public (Schmitter and Karl, 1991, p. 76). While democracy encompasses these basic elements, there are many forms of democracy. Some argue that western democracy is the only form of democracy that will not allow devolution to authoritarianism with its emphasis on accountability, most often through the electoral process (Alexander, 2005, p. 155). But other forms of democracy are present around the world without these “safeguards” against tyranny. Robert Dahl’s (2005) seminal work outlined the principles that must exist for democracy to function in a large group of people. Among his seven tenants, only one concerned free, fair, and frequent elections. Dahl’s other criteria include elected officials, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship (p. 188). Dahl’s understanding expands democracy beyond the primarily western conception and idea of government that is representative in nature. Democracy is a broader concept that can be widely applied to a variety of countries and cultures.

Democracy can have a range of simplistic and complex manifestations. Larry Diamond (2009) defines democracy in its most basic form as an electoral democracy—one that allows regular, free and fair elections (p. 414). In this sense, electoral democracies allow for this competition of ideas manifested through a variety of candidates and a variety of individuals vying for positions of power. These individuals are selected by a fair and honest vote of the people. Diversity in ideas must be represented by the candidates and freedom of choice of the population must be allowed in the electoral process. Diamond does expand his definition

beyond these simple, electoral democracies to include liberal democracies. These societies support ideals of freedom, pluralism, justice and accountability (pp. 414-416). The principles of liberal democracies lend themselves to the further establishment of pluralism and justice.

Societies created with the characteristics present in a liberal democracy move beyond the basic characteristics of an electoral democracy. Despite the different manifestations of democracy, the resulting society can be very different depending on the discrete principles within society.

Diversity of opinion and a variety of viewpoints and perspectives serves as a valuable aspect of democracy. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison describes one of the major benefits of a democratic government. One of the benefits of government is that it limits the ability of a singular perspective to take control of the government and dominate its policy. In this way, a diverse population and diverse perspectives prevents an elite faction or radical group from imposing its will on the entire population (Madison, 1787). Individuals want their opinions to be respected and not superseded by the opinions of small elite groups in power. Madison declares that the variety of a union will serve as a check on the tyranny of the majority, or the rule of elites. Racially and ethnically diverse populations with differing ideas and competing interests should be a safeguard against tyranny.

International organizations have endorsed the spread of democracy specifically the dissemination and promotion of democratic ideals. Although many opponents to democracy and its ideals exist in the world today, there has been a significant endorsement of democracy through international organizations like the United Nations. The UN has recently encouraged the expansion of a form of global democracy, lending legitimacy and credibility to this form of government (Therien and Dumontier, 2009, pp. 355-57). This recent trend has attempted to instill democratic principles and ideas on a global and international scale, but it has not yet established democracy as the acceptable standard against which all governments and regimes

will be measured. Although it has not achieved this status, democracy and its wide acceptance is spreading throughout the globe because of advocacy from organizations like the United Nations.

Freedom and diversity of ideas promote discussion and differing ideas as a check on autocratic thought control. Although liberal democracies are not the standard form of government throughout the world, many principles of liberal democracies are present in other types of government. As Madison discussed, a variety of ideas can serve as a check on elitist ideas and extremist positions. Deliberative democracies, democracies that make decisions through an institutionalized and standardized process, have certain elitist and oligarchic tendencies. In these situations, small groups of elites can foist their minority agenda onto the majority voting body. There is extensive rationale for why such small groups should be able to dictate the agenda and processes of the government. Much of this logic lies in the belief that a small educated minority should be the ultimate judge of the will of the people and the policies best for the population (Tucker, 2008, p. 127). This paternalistic tendency eliminates the true purpose of a deliberative democracy. These deliberative governments are intended to account for the will of the people in order to make effective policies. When small minorities preempt this intention by imposing their own will on the majority, the whole system is denigrated and reduced to nothing more than an oligarchy.

Consolidation of power has elevated the role and importance of governments within society over the ability of the population to create change and cause government response. C. Wright Mills (1956) argues that this gradual consolidation has granted an inordinate amount of power to a few, limited, exclusive institutions, with the opportunity for abuse of power. Also, he argues that the denigration of information of the average citizen has left the populace largely unable to compete with the power of the government (pp. 29-32). The population has the

unique ability to serve as a check on government and to ensure that those in power are conducting themselves fairly and responsibly. When the governed choose to be uniformed, they forfeit this ability, granting greater power to the institutions. Therefore, in order to reign in the government and prevent tyrannical rule, an educated class of citizens can provide continual oversight in order to accomplish this goal.

While governments do not need the support of every individual on each specific policy, there must be a general support for the practices of the government and its ability to fulfill its roles. Without the support of the governed, a government is on unstable ground. When the governed are discontented, the government is subject to attacks from oppressed groups, angry about the broken social contract. The basis of Marxist theory indicates that individuals, when oppressed, will eventually result to protest, sometimes even violent in nature (Boswell and Dixon, 1993, pp. 681-683). While Marxist theories revolve around economic rights, individuals are also likely to oppose governments when they feel that their moral rights are being suppressed. The concept of moral rights exists outside of the constraints of authority. Morality is defined individually, independent of any imposed authority (Skitka, et. al, 2009, p. 568-69). The moral opposition to authority tends to be a stronger pull than the simple convictions of institutional oppression. When one feels he or she has a moral right to receive consideration from the government, he or she is more likely to pursue those rights (p. 570). Short sighted governments do not fully understand the importance of individuals' moral attachments to their rights; the strength of this moral attachment provides motivation and commitment for individuals involved in the struggle.

Which comes first: Legitimacy or Democracy?

While legitimacy is necessary to provide continued support for democracy, it is difficult to tell whether this measure of legitimacy exists before democratic principles are in place.

Democracy is often disseminated before the measure of legitimacy is conducted. Once the democratic government is functioning and democratic principles are in place, the evaluation of legitimacy will follow. Scholars argue that the success of democracy, or any form of government, in providing greater benefits for its citizens, including a higher standard of living, longer life expectancy, greater social benefits, will bolster the legitimacy of the government (Lipset, et. al, 1993, pp. 166-167). A government must function before legitimacy can be fully measured. However, a government cannot function without a certain measure of initial legitimacy. Democracy cannot be imposed arbitrarily without an understanding of the foundational values and principles that must serve to undergird the transition to a democratic form of government.

Statistical analysis shows that legitimacy is not a strong prerequisite of democracy. Fails and Pierce (2010) used a combined measure of support for democracy, opposition to authoritarianism, and satisfaction with democracy. This analysis defied the commonly held belief that legitimacy affected the ability for democracy to take root in a country. The control variables showed that larger national income lent itself better to democracy (Fails and Pierce, 2010, p. 179). This research shows that legitimacy is not directly correlated with an increase in the strength of democracy in a nation. This does not, however, indicate that legitimacy is not necessary for a government to function. Legitimacy is still valid for a government to continue. It is still an important concept for understanding that ability of a government to function and the importance of the support of the governed.

Informing Discussion: A Free Media

An important requisite of democracy is the opportunity for communal deliberation through engaged, thoughtful and informed discussion. The democratic process is dependent on this discussion and the ability to arrive at an informed decision (Nickel, 2000, p.3). Several

elements contribute to this ability for informed discussion, specifically the presence of free speech and free media rights. Political discourse and discussion rests in the top tier of free speech rights, reserved as some of the most fundamental and important requirements of free speech (p. 5). The ability to express one's opinions freely allows for the open dissemination of ideas without censorship or fear of negative repercussions. The media serves as a means of spreading and broadcasting these differing opinions to the entire population. Without a free media, dissenting and differing voices within society may not be recognized on a larger scale. In order for a truly free and informed discussion, a free media must exist and operate.

With the growing size of the population represented by a democracy, the media has become more important for enabling communication. Today, most political communication is mediated and indirect (Bohman, 2000, p.48). Because of the sheer size of populations, the dissemination of ideas cannot occur organically. Instead, most political participation is completed through institutions (p.49). The media serves as one critical institution that allows and facilitates political interaction. Media also allows for communication between experts and the lay community. Without a complicated web of media publications, the messages and information dispelled by expert sources and organizations would not be able to reach the majority of the population (p. 51). Academic journals and other resources are not readily available or easily interpreted by the whole of the population. Therefore, the media creates and opportunity for mediated communication between experts and different members of the general population. This conversation facilitates informed discussion and information.

The nature of mediated political conversation, discussion and deliberation leaves the media with great power for shaping the content of information. The pluralistic nature of most societies causes a further dissection of media into smaller, more specific fragments. Because the different segments of society require different information, the media outlets are forced to

tailor the information and its presentation to specific groups and markets (Bohman, 2000, pp. 55-56). The pluralistic nature of society demands the media to offer different perspectives, balancing the nature of media presented. Also, the professional standards of the media industry advocate a fair and balanced approach to presentation of information (p. 58). These two elements combine to prevent media from some degree of bias in its presentation of information.

Importance of Rights

Rights often have a moral and intrinsic attachment to individuals, extending beyond legal implications. This collection of rights is so natural that these rights have been deemed as universal in more recent days and international organizations have begun the process of declaring the universality of these rights and ensuring their security in nations around the world (Winston, 2007, p. 282). The defense of human rights has become more prominent following the end of the Cold War Era (Pityana, 2007, pp. 48-49). This new era of democratization and creation of governments around the world now emphasizes the universality, interrelatedness and interdependent nature of human rights (p. 45). Human rights are becoming a standard expectation, not subject to the type of government or regime in place in a given location. The push for *universal* human rights shows that these rights extend beyond borders, cultural differences, and any individual differences. These human rights are absolute, expected and required.

Organizations like the United Nations exist apart from individual governments and individual regimes and are often able to provide international action on important and universal issues like human rights. In 1948, the United Nations adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This policy established, not only the United Nations' commitment to the principles of human rights, but also encouraged its many member countries to disseminate and expound

upon the rights guaranteed. The first several articles of the Declaration provide equality for all as members of humanity and states that these rights must be granted without regard to any individual characteristic. The charter guarantees the right to life, liberty, and security, freedom from servitude and torture, freedom before the law, freedom of movement and residence, freedom to marry and create a family, freedom of thought, religion, opinion, freedom to participate in government, freedom of employment, and a right to education (UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1948). These extensive rights are now set as a standard for behavior of governments in power. The United Nation's choice to outline these specific rights gives weight and legitimacy to the universality of these rights. The United Nations and its influence extend beyond the clout of a single nation; this coalition allows for a greater, more far reaching applicability to nations around the world.

Although the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights was produced in 1948, egregious human rights abuses still occurred, following this point, and even continue now, decades later. The American system of racial segregation denied African Americans the rights of freedom and equality with the invention of separate facilities with differing amenities. The South African government also oppressed its colored populations with the legalized system of apartheid. This program of racial segregation stripped the black South Africans of their rights to employment, education, to move about freely, engage in cultural activities and start families of their own choosing. In both of these cases, the United Nation's declaration was not enough to stop the injustices occurring. Despite the UN's attempts to firmly outline the rights of every individual, many governments chose to ignore these tenants set forth.

Origins of Resistance

Dissent and general discontent with the actions of a political regime in power are common in every society, so political resistance is not always significant. Although, resistance

and opposition to the government in power can often be categorized as political violence, this is not always the case. Political violence exists when militarized resistance movements rise to counter the government in power or when the government in power uses violent actions to suppress a protest group. The baseline discontent that exists within society can form into political violence and organized protests once certain conditions are met. These conditions are referred to as “political opportunity” and include regime shifts, periods of political instability or a change in the ruling political elites or other alterations in the political climate in order for this unrest to manifest itself (Porta, 2008, p. 223). In order for political violence to present itself within society beyond general disaffection with ruling powers, the political climate changes rather than the individuals in the group itself. Research shows that militarized factions are most often a result of this political opportunity and other circumstances of political instability, rather than a change in the beliefs and convictions of the people (Kriesi, 1989, p. 295). The shift in emphasis on political conditions rather than the sentiments of the populations stresses the importance for established government to prevent regime changes and other lapses of political stability as these occurrences are a breeding ground for dissent.

Once the political instability occurs as a result of a shift in the political conditions, the regime in power has several courses of action as a direct response to the new forms of resistance. Although the political opportunity enables the opposition to form and express discontent, this does not ensure that the resistance movement will thrive and present significant, meaningful opposition to the regime. The success of the newly organized opposition greatly depends on the reaction of the regime to this new resistance. A popular reaction of governments to pockets of resistance is “policing the protest.” This action of stifling revolts, protests and opposition activities, often using violence and legal or physical force, often produces radicalization and elements of fervor to the protestors. Groups of protesters that

organize during political opportunities may not use violence to convey their feelings of dissatisfaction, but a violent reaction from the powers at be is more likely to beget a violent response from the groups of resistance. This process of escalating violence can be seen in many examples throughout Europe, specifically in Northern Ireland and in the Basque movements (Porta, 2008, p. 225). Not only does the practice of policing the protest often lead to a militarization of the present protest groups, but often radicalization occurs as well. As individuals within the society see the practices of the government, it is more likely that radical elements will form as a reaction to the policing measures and apparent oppression stemming from the practices of the government in power (Porta, 2008, p. 224-225). This practice is commonly referred to as the Law of Coercive Responsiveness in more recent research and literature (Pierskalla, 2010, p. 118). Therefore, although the regime's choice to police the protest is an attempt to quell dissent and remain in power, these practices often inadvertently creates both more radical and more militarized movements of resistance.

Models of Resistance and Government Response

Governments are often accused of "repression," but this political term is difficult to define. Some have defined repression as the use of social or political coercion within the territorial jurisdiction by the area's political authorities (Goldberg, 1978, p. 52). According to this definition, regimes that use sociopolitical methods to control the population they govern are guilty of repression. There are two forms of repression that are common. The first kind of repression is the restriction of civil liberties. In this class of offenses, governments place restrictions on freedoms of assembly and movements, as well as free speech. Arrests are common as are curfews and banning. The other form of resistance is referred to as personal integrity violations. These violations are more person-centered such as mass killings and direct threats to human life. Both of these attempts to modify behavior have consequences, but the


latter much stronger consequences than the former. The elimination of human opposition is a greater evil than constraints on human behavior (Davenport, 2007, p. 487). Regardless of the type of repression practiced by these regimes, within the structure of western democratic ideals, political coercion and repression are viewed as negative traits within a regime.

There is little consensus in present research as to the reason governments suppress resistance or the effects of such choices. Some more recent models show that weak governments will be forced to compromise with the opposition while stronger governments can repress opposition and prevent its expansion to the uninvolved segments of the populace (Pierskalla, 2010, p.119). This new model indicates that government utilization of violence and other more extreme forms of policing protest can be very effective methods of suppressing opposition and maintaining support and legitimacy. Several other models prominent models do not come to a consensus of belief on the effects of repression on subversive factions (Hibbs 1973; Muller and Opp 1986; Muller and Weede 1990; Rasler 1996). While no combination of models displays a direct correlation between government suppression of resistance and the ability of the government to quell such movements, theories of policing protest and the Law of Coercive Responses indicate that governments using violence could experience escalation rather than suppression. These theories run in opposition to the model of violence as an effective means of suppressing violence.

Using cost-benefit analysis, it is easy to understand why opposition exists. Opposition occurs following discontent with a specific policy or practice by the government in control. Once the opposition is formed, it rivals the government. If the status quo remains intact, the government benefits from the continued control, but the opposition gains no new ground. In order for the opposition to change the status quo, they must incur the cost of protest. Following protest, the government has a choice to respond. The government can choose to

provide accommodations, directly or indirectly, to the opposition forces at a cost to themselves. The cost to the government is now the gain of the opposition. In this scenario, the opposition always has the opportunity to act against the government again to gain more ground, or to stand down and acquiesce to government control. These four outcomes are listed as follows: *Repress-Escalate*, *Repress-Acquiesce*, *Accommodate-Escalate* and *Accommodate-Acquiesce* (Pierskalla, 2010, p. 123). This model, pictured below in Figure 1, demonstrates the possible

Figure 1 Pierskalla, J. H. (2010), "Protest, deterrence, and escalation: The strategic calculus of government repression," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54 (1), 117-145.



outcomes of each conflict between a government and its opponents. This basic model holds regardless the composition of a group or its practices.

The government's choice to *repress* can often come in the form of violence or curtailing the rights and practices of its citizens. This form of "punishment" leaves the government open to the threat of conflict from the opposition. This danger is especially high if the government has not completed implementation of a policy that is pleasing to its adversaries. Although this model leaves open the chance of conflict, this model presupposes that certain statements are

true. According to this model, it is less costly for the opposition to organize peaceable resistance than violent resistance (Pierskalla, 2010, p. 124). While in the short term, it may be less costly to organize non-violent resistance, the outcome may be less effective than if violence was used. However, in accordance with this model, the government can presuppose that opposition will be likely be non-violent rather than violent in nature. Also, this model assumes that it is less costly to quell protests than it is to suppress escalating violence (Pierskalla, 2010, p. 124). Therefore, there is greater benefit for governments to opt for repression, at least initially, in order to stop protests from occurring. These two suppositions, when coupled together, provide governments with added incentives to repress protest without the added fear of violence.

If the government chooses to accommodate the opposition, new policies will be implemented as a direct response to criticism. Once the policy is in place and accommodation has occurred, rationally, it makes the most sense for the opposition to acquiesce. While this is not always the case, the pattern of *Accommodate-Acquiesce* cannot result in escalation (Pierskalla, 2010, p. 124). If the adversarial component accepts the accommodation as reasonable, no escalation can occur and the conflict is resolved. In this way, there are some benefits for governments in choosing the option of accommodation. Once accommodation occurs, it is rare that a group would choose escalation as a response. Therefore, if a government sought to avoid escalation, accommodation is the most effective choice.

Autocratic governments often possess a greater amount of control over their citizens. In this way, autocratic governments can often easily suppress protests and even the violence that might occur as a result of such a choice (Pierskalla, 2010, pp. 124-125). Since autocratic governments retain a greater amount of control of their citizens, they do not fear escalation as much as other forms of government. When escalation is not a fear, governments are inclined to

repress the opposition. In this scenario, the government in power has little incentive to compromise with the opposition since the resulting violence and escalation of the situation is not a pressing threat. Therefore, since the escalation is not a deterring factor, it is very easy for autocratic to choose the initial action of repression in hopes of securing acquiescence from the opposition forces. Even if acquiescence does not come, the regime can be confident in its ability to quell repression and dissent that may occur as a result of their non-responsiveness to the demands of the opposition. Herein exists the problem with an autocratic regime. Without the fear of escalation and the realistic threat to their power and control, there is little reason for an autocratic regime to be receptive to any form of adversarial resistance. Without the incentive to compromise and the ability to compromise, autocratic governments can become tyrannical and dictatorial, leaving its citizens with little recourse for this oppression¹. The threat of escalation is an important deterrent for governments in order to prevent the callous and indiscriminate repression of opposition leading to the spread of tyrannical control over a specific population.

Since there is variation that exists among autocratic governments, it is important to understand which forms of autocratic governments, and which elements of those governments lend themselves to repressive actions. Some research has shown that autocratic leaders with isolated decision making abilities are more likely to engage in repressive behaviors (Davenport, 2007, p. 486). When the political power is spread to a greater number of organizations and political party apparatuses, there are fewer opportunities for individuals to abuse political power in the form of coercive and repressive actions. This simple but significant difference allows two forms of government, both labeled autocracies, to deal with political resistance in

¹ Although autocratic regimes are often labeled as “tyrannical,” this does not especially hold true. “Tyrannical” is a broad reaching term that lacks specific and definite criteria. Also, as with any other descriptor of governments and political systems, there exist discrete levels of measure (Davenport, 2007, p. 485). Therefore, it follows that all autocratic governments must not be tyrannical and all tyrannical governments must not be labeled completely tyrannical. These shades of delineation must be highlighted in order to fully understand the various models of repression that exist among governments.

divergent ways. It is important to analyze autocracies on a more nuanced level in order to understand the connection between autocracies and the tyrannical actions often associated with these forms of government. Autocracies are capable of avoiding tyranny if specific elements and structures are in place within the governments.

Elements of democracy decrease instances of repression among governments and there are specific elements of autocratic governments that also lend themselves to reduced instances of repression. While a comprehensive body of research does not exist comparing the various democratic elements of autocratic regimes in order to determine how each deals with protest, the research that has been conducted demonstrates the presence of democratic elements does decrease government oppression (Walter, 1969; Dallin & Breslauer, 1970; Boudreau, 2004). For example, the level of political insulation has a direct correlation on the propensity for oppressive practices. Oligarchic systems composed of the rule of a few are more likely to result in oppressive activities than single party democracies that are still considered to be autocratic in nature (Davenport, 2007, p. 486). The presence of a single party, complete with institutions and levels of government, provides greater opportunities for accommodation of the opposition.

Violence, or Not: That is the Question

Within these models of resistance, there exists a variety of tactics and methods for accomplishing change. There are two primary tactics for organized resistance, which can generally be labeled as non-violent or violent. These labels define both the ideology of the movement and its practices. Non-violent movements use means of passive resistance, often emulating the principles of Gandhi, in order to bring about change. This practice of “civil disobedience” is a well-known paradigm for resistance movements. Violent resistance, on the other side, focuses on more direct, often militarized actions. Violence often occurs after frustration with methods of non-violence are incapable of accomplishing its goals. Frustration

with non-violent tactics can be seen in the case of the African National Congress and its militarized branch *Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)*. The ANC founded this branch following violent actions by the State. Although both violent and non-violent movements both seek to foment change in the government, the means employed to bring about such change differ greatly.

Non-Violent Movements

The goal of non-violent resistance, like all resistance, is to bring about change in the present structure of governance. Because these movements lack firepower and physical force, the strength of non-violent campaigns rests in the ability to gain support of a great number of individuals (Tinker, 1971, p. 776). This grassroots form of resistance depends largely on the tacit consent of the population. The Gandhian method of resistance is based on the principle of *satyagraha*. In accordance with this principle, individuals subject themselves to some form of tacit suffering in order to affect change and draw notice from the offending party. The offending party, usually one in leadership, feels an emotional reaction to the innocent suffering and is compelled to change (pp. 775-777). Tinker (1971), however, argues that the Gandhian ethic extends beyond two actors. Instead of the sufferer and the oppressor, there is the additional presence of an on-looking public (p. 777). The strength of non-violent resistance stems, not only from the mobilization of the population, but also the interest of the larger population.

Non-violent resistance uses suffering in order to highlight the tyranny or injustice of a specific policy or the practices of the government in power. This methodology is often important to draw attention from the public. Because non-violent resistance is popular often within the lowest income members of society, this suffering is often viewed as a larger issue of societal injustice (Von Eschen, Kirk and Pinard, 1969, pp. 217-220). The ability for non-violent movements to draw in individuals from the poorest segments of society magnifies the injustice of social policies and practices. Non-violence is also most useful in struggles where minorities

are denied rights by a majority power (Vander Zanden, 1963, p. 544). In situations where minority groups are oppressed or encumbered by a specific policy, providing evidence of suffering and injustice is not difficult. Non-violence depends on the sympathy of a public, outraged by gross social injustices.

Violent Resistance

Although violent resistance always has political aims, political violence is not always intended to cause fear among the population. Terrorism, a specific form of political violence, does aim to inspire fear as its main objective, but this is not the intention of all forms of violence (Held, 1997, p. 188). Violence against the government is often viewed as inappropriate, regardless of the context. But some theories do not define all violence against the state as political violence. Political violence is often informed by one's beliefs, especially religious and moral convictions (p. 189). Political violence, often considered a more extreme action than non-violent or non-cooperation, has strong ties to one's moral and ethic convictions and understanding of the world.

Violent movements do not typically begin with extreme action. Often these movements begin by espousing violent tactics, though some movements do progress to supporting violent actions (Roberts, 1989, 767). Political violence also follows non-violent tactics. Regardless of the success of non-violent practices, political violence is often viewed as an alternative and more expedient action (Sibley, 1989, p. 789). In both the Anti-Apartheid and Civil Rights Movements, the assassination of popular resistance leaders turned the rhetoric to violence (p. 813). Evidence of assassination as an impetus for violence can be seen specifically in the case of the assassination of Malcolm X. The shift to violence is often gradual and occurs over a period of time.

A turn to violence is often indicated as the transition point from reform to revolution. Franz Fanon, an influential advocate of violent opposition, indicated that violence was almost inevitable in a system of decolonization. The vertical violence of the oppressing society against the native society will translate into horizontal violence of the colonized towards the colonizing force. The oppressor's violence, once internalized, will become personal and collective, directed towards the feat of liberation (Bulhan, 1958, pp. 137-140). Fanon's understanding of violence as endemic to former colonial societies explains the seeming inevitability of the violent response. Once an organization responds to the government's policies in the form of violence, opportunity for a peaceful resolution is eliminated. Instead, Fanon identifies armed resistance as a phase in the larger movement of struggle. Violent resistance is not the ultimate means, but a last resort option that serves a specific purpose in the greater picture of resistance movements as a whole (pp. 147-148). Fanon defines violence as a larger piece in the ultimate struggle for freedom from oppression. Understanding violence as a necessary and natural part of ending oppression challenges the normal paradigm of political violence and its negative connotations.

Much like non-violence, political violence can also be justified from a moral perspective. A theology of social justice does not condone political passivity. Instead, it advocates action on the part of the oppressed. This theology's legitimacy would be greatly undermined if it allowed injustice to operate unchecked. A theology of last resort does impose restrictions on armed action and militant response, but it does allow for such actions (Villa-Vicencio, 1990, pp.9-10). Theology focused on conceptions of social justice allow for greater leniency in the area of armed resistance. In this conception, violence is both understandable and advocated as a responsibility. Villa-Vicencio (1990) does indicate that armed resistance does not automatically create political legitimacy for the organization, however. Instead, the principle of social justice is considered the most basic foundation necessary for moral legitimacy (pp. 102-109).

Therefore, although political organizations utilizing violent tactics might not gain automatic legitimacy, the principles of social justice which they advocate are considered the basest form of moral legitimacy for any government structure. Violence that seeks to pursue this social justice can be justified from a moral and ethic standpoint.

Determining What is Effective?

The models discussed above allow for a variety of outcomes from the clash between resistance movements and the governments in power. The goal of resistance organizations is to effect change. McAdam (2000) identifies six common goals of all resistance movements, regardless of the target and end goal. These factors include: gaining new recruits, sustaining morale of members, gaining media coverage, especially if favorable, mobilizing support in the population, constraining opponents and shaping public policy and government action (p.117). Three of these goals focus on the organization's position within society: the ability to gain favorable media attention, maintain a strong base of membership and bring change from the government. Political opposition movements need support from the population in order to bring about a significant change from the government. Without the support for the population and the growing membership, the opposition's presence will not be significant enough to warrant change from the government. In order to gain the attention and support of the population, the media can be used as a means for highlighting the organization's goals and the injustice of the government's policies or practices. Together these three elements give a general understanding of the ability of an organization to cause change in government policies. Although these three factors are not comprehensive, they give an adequate overview and inquiry into an organization's effectiveness.

No News is Bad News

A free media and the ability to express one's ideas without constraint is often linked to democracy as a key democratic ideal. Although there does seem to be a correlation between free media and democracy, not all democracies have a free and fair media, conversely, not all autocracies have state controlled media (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, p. 596). Because the status of the media is not directly related to the type of regime that exists in a nation at any given time, the facet of media coverage is still important in the measurement of effectiveness. While autocratic governments may have state-controlled media enterprises, limited media is not always the present in autocratic regimes. In the same way, a democratic government may not have a truly free media, despite its label of "democracy." The presence of media coverage is a relevant and valuable variable in comparing the effectiveness of resistance movements, regardless of whether the media is independent or state-controlled.

Media coverage is a strong signal of the importance of a movement. Once an organization is asserting its influence and accomplishing its tasks, the media will respond. If the media is controlled by the state, as is the case in some autocratic governments, evaluation of opposition may not be accurate in its portrayal. However, the spread of international media allows for greater oversight and greater opportunities for impartiality. The number of occurrences of media coverage, combined with the type of media (broadcast or print) and the level of media coverage (international or domestic) showcase the importance of the organization and its ability to affect change.

The content of the media coverage is also important to mention. While McAdam (2000) does not state that organizations must secure favorable media, he states that positive media is a definite asset to an organization (p. 117). Some organizations are able to create their own media publications in order to inform its members and the general population of its activities and goals (Rhodes, 2001, p. 151). These media sources can provide a biased, yet positive

perspective on organizations that might have difficulty securing positive media attention from mainstream sources. Since positive media coverage is necessary for a successful movement, some organizations have developed methods to circumvent the negative media attention, or lack of media attention, from mainstream sources.

Size Matters

The second measure of the effectiveness of a resistance movement is the size of the movement. Grassroots movements and political campaigns that utilize the strength of numbers and can mobilize large segments of the population have an opportunity to effect change (McAdam, 2000, p. 117). Governments can easily ignore a few individuals, but as discontentment grows, so does the need for government intervention. Movements with greater numbers have greater chances for success. Members of these movements may be concentrated in a small geographic region or spread throughout the entirety of a nation or many nations. Diversity in geography and composition of group members can bring strength to movements. It is important to understand the size of organizations in order to understand their breadth and depth of influence in the locations they are located. The size of an organization can contribute to its ability to succeed in accomplishing its missions and goals.

Getting a Response

Opposition that challenges authority warrants a response. From the perspective of the resistance, the ideal outcome in these situations involves accommodation from the authorities. An opposition group that challenges the government in power and receives some form of accommodation will have a policy passed or some positive measure of redress for their grievances. This is the measure of success of an opposition group (McAdam 2000, p. 119). If the government alters its policies in line with the demands of a resistance movement, then that movement has had some level of success. The goal of opposition groups is to produce a change

in the government's policies or actions. Therefore, this is the single most important measure of the effectiveness of organized resistance.

However, the government may choose to repress the requests of segments of resistance. This is also significant in measuring the effectiveness of a movement. Once the government chooses repression, the situation may escalate from this response. Repression can be an important part of effecting change. The process of continued repression and escalation can also result in change. Immediate accommodation is not the only indication of effectiveness. Any change from the government shows some level of effect. Since effect is the goal, timeliness is not the greatest concern. Escalation may delay positive results, but it does not eliminate them.

Comparing Cases

Analyzing several groups across two similar movements provides the ability to explore a variety of resistance groups to compare their effectiveness in similar, but not identical situations. Examples are drawn from the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and the Civil Rights Movement in America. These movements have some similarities, but several notable differences. Both movements focus on achieving greater racial equality within society, struggling against legalized segregation. Also, both movements had violent and non-violent factions using differing ideologies to fight the same injustices. Both nations were ultimately successful in achieving greater racial equality, reversing much of the legalized segregation in place at the time.

The significant difference between the two movements provides fodder for comparison. In South Africa, the white racial minority was responsible for the oppression of the black majority. In the United States, the African American minority was oppressed by the racial majority. The South African government was more autocratic in nature than the American

“democracy” that existed in this country. Institutions like a free press and the representative democratic principles were not standard in South Africa like they were in America. Also, the international community had a much greater influence on change in South Africa than in the United States, largely because of the success of the United States in achieving racial equality. These differences in governmental structure and the presence of democratic principles lend themselves to a comparison between the two nations and the two situations and the effectiveness of the movements in those countries.

The final difference between the cases, aside from location, is the method of resistance. There is one major distinction between these resistance groups: the use of violence and militant tactics. Some groups practiced non-violence throughout the entire duration of their struggle. Other movements, frustrated with the lack of productivity in non-violent methods, shifted to the use of more militant tactics. This can be best seen in the South African National Congress and its creation of a militant arm, Umkhonto we Sizwe. The distinction between militant and non-militant groups is fairly simple. The significance in this difference is the government’s reaction to both of these types of movements. Both a violent and non-violent group has been selected from each movement, the anti-apartheid and Civil Rights movements, in order to provide comparison across the movements.

Within the labels of non-violent movements and militant movements, there are further distinctions. Some non-violent movements, most notably in the American Civil Rights movement, focused primarily on non-violent activism. This included peaceful protests, speeches, sit-ins and other non-violent actions. Other groups focused on larger and more institutional forms of non-violent actions. In the case of the anti-apartheid movement, the international community was able to impose economic sanctions, organize boycotts, and publicly condemn the government in South Africa and its historic color bar in order to provide

significant resistance. These differences in non-violent tactics provide further methods for comparison. Are institutional and economic boycotts more effective than non-violent activism?

Among the militant movements, there are differences as well. In the case of the Black Panther Movement, the organization focused on rhetoric and mobilization, but this never manifested itself on a large scale. Instead, figures like Malcolm X sought to empower the Black community to rise up and stand against oppression—violently if necessary. This organization condoned violence, although very little violence actually occurred. In South Africa, the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe was a militant organization in policy and in its practice. Umkhonto is often labeled as a “terrorist” organization (Pogrud, 2003, p.99). It was responsible for destruction of government property through bombings, sabotage and other violent acts. Here there is a clear difference between the two militant organizations. One espouses and advocates violence, the other organizes violent actions. Is violence in practice more effective than the threat of violence?

Measurement and Structure

For the most part, the data provided as evidence will be qualitative in nature. Because these movements are largely historical and the points of evaluation include a combination of factors, this research lends itself best to qualitative data. Qualitative data will allow a more in-depth understanding of the practical and historic outcomes of each movement. This, in turn, will lend itself easily to determining the effectiveness of each group in securing and providing political change. In each category of evaluation, the groups will be determined as successful or unsuccessful in accomplishing its goal of effecting positive change. Each of the four groups investigated will then receive a composite rating of high effectiveness, moderate effectiveness, or low effectiveness, based on its performance in each of the three categories of measurement.

Three successes, one in each category, will translate into a rating of highly effective, two successes to moderately effective, one success or no successes to low effectiveness. This system will enable a clear comparison between the various groups, despite the qualitative nature of the data.

Media coverage will be measured in a qualitative manner. As stated before, the content of the media will not be evaluated, but rather the presence of media coverage. This measurement will include the number of media sources covering a specific event or form of protest from the groups. This will also extend to the identified leaders of each of the organizations. This evaluation will span all forms of media, including television, newspaper and radio. It will also specify whether the media coverage occurred domestically or internationally. Groups that display evidence of both international and domestic media demonstrate a strong presence. An organization will be considered successful in this area if a variety of media coverage exists. This would include a variety amongst mediums, as well as both internationally and domestically. Media exposure provides an indication of the ability of each group to communicate its message effectively.

The size of each group will be measured in relatively simple ways. Emphasis will be placed on the number of participants in each movement. Since membership levels are difficult to determine and fluctuate throughout each period, it is best to measure participation. In some cases, like the Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement, participation may be measured on the country level. In other cases, participation will be measured by the number of individuals that act in various resistance campaigns. Other indications of membership may include voting records and other measures of popular support. In order to truly measure an organization's ability to mobilize the population, the number of participants, not only its firmest membership totals, also must be accounted for.

In the category of government response, the effectiveness will be measured using the model described previously. In this model, the government can choose accommodation or repression (Pierskalla, 2010, p. 123). If, at any point, the government chooses accommodation, the group will be considered successful in this category. The period of time over which the group may endure several bouts of repression and further assertion will be noted in the analysis. However, once it is determined that the government has opted for some form of acquiescence or accommodation, a group will be given a positive mark in this category. While the overarching goal of each group is to provide equality, this measure will pertain to the more specific mission of the group. For example, while the Black Panther movement did want segregation laws to be removed generally, their ten point doctrine espoused specific desired changes, including full employment for the entire Black community, an end to all aggressive conflicts around the world and full freedom for all members of the Black community in prison. This organization will be evaluated on the government's response to these issues specifically, rather than the general desire for greater equality.

Cases for Comparison

United States Civil Rights Movement

The issue of racial injustice existed in America from the nation's very inception. Societal injustices of slavery persisted even after the institution was outlawed by the 14th Amendment. The struggle for equality and racial freedom pre-dated the Civil War. Yet the beginning of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement is often marked with the beginning of the Montgomery Bus Boycott (McAdam, 2000, p. 124). This boycott served as the landmark beginning and the first victory of the American Civil Rights Movement. The American Civil Rights Movement lasted from 1955 until 1968, marked by periods of mass demonstrations, boycotts, and racial rhetoric. Many different organizations mobilized to combat the racial injustices of the time.

The American Civil Rights Movement is best known for the use of civil disobedience and non-violent action. Leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. are well known for their Gandhian tactics and appeal to non-violent actions. Organizations like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) used a network of churches, combined with an appeal to a moral authority in order to combat the racial injustices of segregation (Roberts, 1989, p. 762). This utilization of pre-established networks enabled a mass mobilization of individuals for boycotts and protests. The strength of the non-violent resistance existed in the number of individuals willing to participate. As more and more individuals joined the campaigns hosted by the SCLC and other organizations in cities across the South, the local and national government began to notice and respond.

But not all forms of resistance to segregation came in the form of non-violent resistance. Some, disenchanted with the work of leaders, like King, formed separate militant organizations to petition the government for an end to segregation. The Black Panther Party (BPP) formed with the intention of bringing greater racial equality, "by any means necessary" (Austin, 2006, p. 127). The contrast between the non-violence of organizations like the SCLC and the militancy of the BPP provided much fodder for the media. The Civil Rights Movement was thoroughly covered in a range of media sources. A disruptive activity, regardless of its tactic, is often considered newsworthy (McAdam, 2000, p. 126). The Civil Rights Movement, across all organizations, attempted to highlight and overturn the segregationist policies in the United States through a series of disruptive circumstances. While some of these organizations would be more adept at triggering a response in the government, all members of the Civil Rights Movement worked for the eventual integration and fair treatment of all members of society.

Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), was formed in 1957 as a confederation of black leaders, predominately clergy, ready to rise against the injustices of segregation. The movement's most prominent member of leadership was the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., although other men like Fred Shuttlesworth and Ralph Abernathy were also very involved in this organization. The SCLC's goal was to form a group of mass nonviolent direct action (Carson, 2005, p. 17). The members of this organization organized the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955². Although this boycott occurred before the foundation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the boycott's success was quintessential for the founding of the movement. The church in Montgomery became a prominent organization responsible for providing leadership, strategy, as well as economic and community support for the burgeoning protest movement (Kinshasa, 2006, p. 18). The Southern Christian Leadership Conference unified these clergy and other religious leaders in order to form a vanguard for southern African American communities to protest and oppose the racist policies in place during this time.

The SCLC stressed tactics of non-violence in order to bring about an end to racist policies. The organization would target a specific geographic area, often a city, and seek to provide direct resistance to the policies in that area. This resistance would often come in a combination of forms, including: economic boycotts, marches, protests, sit-ins and mass detainments. One of the main benefits of non-violent resistance is its adaptability to several situations (Roberts, 1989, p. 763). This adaptability lent itself to application in cities throughout

² Although the Montgomery Bus Boycott was led and conducted by the Montgomery Improvement Association, this was one of the only actions conducted by this organization. Following the boycott and success, the Montgomery Improvement Association's leaders, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph Abernathy, joined a group of leaders seeking to expand to an organization with capabilities extending beyond a given city. The fruit of this discussion was the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Therefore, for the course of this investigation, the focus is on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, rather than the Montgomery Improvement Association.

the south. Rather than target the entirety of racism and segregation in an area, the SCLC would target one specific facet of segregation. For example, the focus of the Birmingham campaign was segregation in businesses³. The combined approach of a boycott of lunch counters and downtown stores brought specific focus to a singular issue of racism (Fairclough, 1987, pp. 115-116). For this reason, the Birmingham was much more successful than the Albany, Georgia campaign because of its singular approach.

Media

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference was extremely capable of utilizing the media in order to magnify and broadcast their protests and boycotts. The person of Martin Luther King contributed greatly to the amount of media coverage this organization received. King's special ability to communicate the needs and desires of the Black community to white audiences afforded him great success in the media, disproportionate to other leaders of the Civil Rights Movement (Carson, 1987, p. 452). King is often seen as one of the foremost leaders of the Civil Rights Movement because of his prominence within the media. King's arrest and detainment was the fodder of national news. King's famous response to white Southern clergy members, "The Letter from Birmingham Jail," was published, without his consent, in the *New York Post Sunday Magazine*, a publication popular with middle class white society (Bass, 2002, p. 140). King did not even seek media coverage, yet it followed his every movement. This only served as a greater strength to the SCLC and its movements.

The SCLC's actions depended on a strong media presence for success. The non-violent resistance campaigns used by the SCLC aimed to showcase the injustice of the segregationist policies in America. In order to demonstrate injustice, the scenes of police brutality and harsh

³ The Albany Campaign in 1965 focused on the dearth of Black voter registration, including marches on government buildings and mass voter registration drives (Fairclough, 1987, p. 250).

treatment had to be broadcasted to a sympathetic public (McAdam, 2000, p. 126). Once the actions of the Birmingham campaign were broadcasted nationally, greater pressure existed for the national government to respond to the looming crisis. Many attribute the national coverage on the Birmingham Church bombing to be responsible for pressuring the federal government enough to result in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (p. 130). The media brought urgency to the situation in areas like Birmingham, creating the feeling of a crisis. Once this crisis mentality was transferred to the public, greater pressure was placed on the President to act through legislation.

Membership

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference was able to utilize church memberships and institutions already in existence in order to draw its base of support. Participation in the SCLC's campaign increased with the success of each campaign. The Birmingham Campaign boasted greater participation than the Albany Campaign, and the Selma Campaign boasted the highest level of participation. During the Birmingham Movement, over 300 people initially volunteered to be arrested (Fairclough, 1987, p. 116). This campaign focused on public marches. Initially, only 46 individuals were arrested. However, as the campaign expanded to incorporate children, over 2,500 individuals were arrested. The prisons were, quite literally, filled as additional room had to be created at the state fairgrounds (pp. 121-125). As news of the massive arrests spread, so did the number of participants in the movement. Not only did the participation increase, but spectatorship increased from hundreds to thousands (p. 121). The increased pressure from a large audience and public awareness increased the pressure on the local city council to respond. Negotiations with the city began shortly after the jails were filled with non-violent protestors (p. 127). The increase in membership had a direct effect on

the ability of the SCLC to run successful campaigns of non-violent resistance in cities like Birmingham and Selma.

Selma was another example of a successful mass resistance campaign. Whereas Birmingham focused on economic boycotts and mass marches, Selma focused on voter registration and mass demonstrations. In the early stages of Selma's voting registration, over 700 people turned out in church meetings to discuss the plan of voter registration (p. 229). The general interest in the goal of the SCLC indicated the overall level of support of the organization and its movement. By January, 265 people were arrested on a march to the courthouse, demanding voter registration. Over 500 children joined the march and were arrested. An additional 300 individuals were jailed, but never registered to vote (pp. 231-232). Despite its inability to add voters to registration rolls, the Selma campaign succeeded in filling the jails with innocent protestors, often children. The 2500 individuals that volunteered for arrest in the context showed the increase in support from the mere 700 that attended planning meetings. This increase shows the general augmentation in the level of support for the SCLC's Selma campaign as the movement wore on.

Government Response

There appears to be a direct correlation between the SCLC's targeted campaigns in Birmingham and Selma specifically. The Birmingham Campaign began with boycotts of department stores and concluded with massive protests and wide-scale arrests. Once the campaign gained greater influence and more individuals participated, greater stress was placed on the local and federal government. Once massive arrests occurred in Birmingham, negotiations began immediately. Both President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy immediately placed personal calls to individual members of the city council, hoping to sway their vote for a quick and favorable resolution (Fairclough, 1987, p. 127). The almost immediate intervention of

political figures like Robert and President John Kennedy shows the implications of the Birmingham campaign on a national level. President Kennedy even announced the settlement in Birmingham in a national press conference (p. 129). This action again showed the importance and effect of the SCLC's campaign on a national level. The President of the United States took time to announce the resolution in a national press conference, covered by a plethora of national media sources. This brought attention to the situation in Birmingham and showed the executive's interest and intervention in the situation in the South, despite the previous failed attempts at legislation.

Legislation also followed the campaigns in Birmingham and Selma. The Birmingham Campaign began in April and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was introduced in mid-May. In a similar fashion, the Selma Campaign began in January and the Voting Rights Bill of 1965 was introduced in mid-March (Fairclough, 1987, p. 250). In both of these examples, legislation followed within months of the non-violent mass action campaigns. In early March 1965, 43 representatives and 7 senators called for legislation and action on the situation in Selma, although legislation was not introduced until a few weeks later (p. 247). This action on the part of elected officials shows a direct response to the SCLC's campaigns in Birmingham and Selma. Introduction of legislation shows the response of the government and the proximity of the legislation to the campaigns indicates a relationship between the two.

The SCLC's campaigns were not without setbacks. In the initial stages of the Birmingham campaign, economic boycotts of downtown stores caused five stores to integrate clientele. Although this was seen as a success, threats of prosecution from police chief, Bull Connor, to the store owners caused a reversion in the policies of integration (Fairclough, 1987, p. 114). The ability of government officials like Bull Connor to threaten the success of non-violent protests campaigns by the SCLC caused significant setbacks. However, the Birmingham

Campaign did effectively demonstrate the effect of segregation on the economy (p. 113). A concrete demonstration that racism was a challenge to the economic success of the city prompted a response from store keepers, for however brief a period, showing the success of the SCLC in highlighting this fact.

Summary

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference served to provide significant leadership for the American Civil Rights Movement. The leaders in this movement, specifically Martin Luther King, Jr., were influential in explaining the nature of goals of their organization. The SCLC succeeded because of its vision, its infrastructure and its concentrated efforts in specific locations. Successes in Birmingham and Selma provided drive to the movement and attention from the general public, the media and elected officials alike. This focus, combined with the ability to mobilize large segments of the population and publicize the event well, translated into a concrete reaction from the government, often in the form of legislation. Although this legislation was far from perfect, the SCLC was effective in accomplishing its goal of providing greater equality for members of the Black community.

Black Power Movement (Black Panther Party)

The Black Power Movement sought to empower the black community to stand up for its rights and freedoms and participate within society. The term “Black Power” was coined by Stokely Carmichael, the founder of the Student Non-violence Coordinating Committee (Strickland, 2001, p. 41). This concept of Black Power was utilized by several movements as a means to encourage action from the African American community. One such organization that formed in the early 1960s under this banner of Black Power was the Black Panther Party. Because the Black Power Movement is too disparate to analyze, the focus of this discussion will shift instead to the Black Panther Party.

In the wake of the assassination of famed Black militant leader, Malcolm X, the Black Panther Party for Self Defense was formed. In 1966, founder Huey Newton began organizing the structure of this new, militant movement. By the end of 1966, the Black Panther Party had produced a comprehensive platform entitled, "What We Want. What We Believe." In this ten point program, the party made several demands, including "full employment for all our people" and "and immediate end to murder and police brutality of Black people" (Congressional Report on The Black Panther Party, 1970, p. 81). While some of these goals were more realistic and attainable than others, this ten-point program served as the motivations and goals of the Black Panther Party throughout its existence. Huey Newton identified the Black Panther Party as a group of revolutionary nationalists. According to his definition, revolutionary nationalists seek to overthrow the government structure in power, rather than working with the institutional structures (Foner, 1970, pp. 50-51). This is one significant difference between the Black Panther Party and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The Black Panther Party also borrowed Malcolm X's idea that the party should be racially homogenous because there can be no black and white unity until Black unity exists (Foner, 1970, p. 55). This racial demarcation is one difference between the BPP and the SCLC.

The Black Panther Party also espoused ideologies of violence, militancy and hatred on many different levels. Huey Newton, founder and leader of the Black Panther Party, indicated that members of the party did not hate indiscriminately, they only hate the oppressor. If this oppressor happens to be white, then he or she would be hated (Foner, 1970, p. 57). In addition to his open recognition of hate, Newton idolized Marxist-Leninist violent revolutionaries like Che Guevarra. These violent guerillas were elevated and outlined as the model man and the ideal for each member of the Black Panther Movement (Foner, 1970, p. 60). But the Black Panther Party did not just preach an ethic of violence, they practiced such an ethic as well. A delegation of

armed Panthers travelled to the California Capitol Building in order to “educate” the Black community on the inability for African-Americans to defend themselves from racist mobs and instances of brutality (Foner, 1970, p. 122). The Black Panthers’ ethic of violence and militancy, combined with its display and show of such force, place this organization in the category of a violent movement.

Media

The Black Panther Movement offered great opportunity for media exposure. The movement sponsored its own forms of media like *The Black Panther* and the *Commemorator*, both newspapers that reported on the pertinent news in the party. These papers extolled leaders like Huey Newton and the tenants of the Black Panther Party (Rhodes, 2001, p. 151). The importance of these papers was to unite disparate populations and communities of Black Nationalists throughout the country. The newspaper also explained the Black Panthers’ campaigns, fundraising attempts and news items (Rhodes, 2001, pp. 153-154). This newspaper , although limited to circulation within the black community, served as a communication to current members of the movement, recruitment and unity for like-minded individuals outside the movement and a manifesto of the beliefs and values of the Black Power Party to society outside the Black community.

While the Party created its newspaper as an alternative to other forms of mass media, the mass media still played a significant role in reporting on the activities of the BPP. As the Party grew in prominence, the mass media often sought comments from the leaders of the Party (Austin, 2006, p. 112). The media’s coverage of the Black Panthers was often very unfavorable. Much of the tension between the BPP and the national media stemmed from the media’s portrayal of the Party as a traditional segment of militarized and violent Black society (Rhodes, 2001, p. 157). The Party was often portrayed in a very simplistic and straightforward

manner (Street, 2010, p. 371). The media's interpretation of the BPP and its leaders served as a detriment to the image the Party hoped to portray to the whole of society. When the Party did receive opportunities to interact with the national media, the content of these press conferences was largely defensive (Austin, 2006, p. 112). The Party chose to create alternate media sources, like its own newspapers, as a means of correcting the misperceptions created by national media sources.

The largest media campaign against the Black Panther Party came during the contentious time of the Vietnam War. As the BPP radicalized, it sought to ally itself with other Marxist-Leninist organizations and nations around the world. The Party began a campaign advocating the insubordination of Black soldiers fighting in Vietnam (Austin, 2006, p. 101). This campaign began around the same time that Eldridge Cleaver offered an undisclosed number of Black forces to support the VietCong in Vietnam (p. 104). These actions, combined with trips to visit Cuba, China and North Korea, set off a fire-storm in the media (pp. 104-105). The BPP was named a radical and subversive organization. Not only did the media extensively cover the visits abroad, but lengthy analysis portrayed the Party as a threat to American Security. This negative media attention prompted Congressional hearings on the activities in Southeast Asia and the safety of forces and troops there (p. 102). The BPP made the media's negative campaign very easy. With their public support and offers of physical support for the United State's enemies certainly made headlines in the news.

Membership

Membership in the Black Panther Party was tentative at first. The organization began with Huey Newton and Bobby Seale and a few close friends. Within the first three weeks, however, there were twenty five members in the Black Panther Party (Brisbane, 1974, p. 199). By the time Huey Newton was arrested several months later and the "Free Huey" campaign

began, there were only thirty members in the organization (Austin, 2006, p. 114). The strength of this organization cannot be drawn from the discrete number of professing members, rather the support and interest garnered by the organization serves as the greatest indicator of the organization's true strength.

Although the BPP could only boast thirty members at the time of Huey Newton's imprisonment, the "Free Huey" campaign was a rousing success. In 1968, over 5,000 people attended one of the "Free Huey" rallies (Austin, 2006, p.117). This is a much greater response than the 30 members that the organization boasted at that time. Not only did 5,000 individuals turn out to show their support for Huey Newton during his imprisonment, but the Party raised over \$10,000 at this rally for Newton's legal defense (p. 119). This indicates that the individuals at this rally were more than just interested by-standers. The attendants showed their support and opened their wallets for Newton's defense. This is even more significant considering most of the BPP's supporters were lower-income or "ghetto Blacks" (Foner, 1970, p. 55). Although the Party's membership totals did not indicate strong support, the organization was able to draw significant support from the Black community.

The mass support generated by the Black Panther Party drew support from many of the disenchanting youth in the ghetto areas of the country. The same elements that resounded with this youth population also resounded well with other members of the Black community. Eldridge Cleaver ran for President in 1968 under the Peace and Freedom Party. In order to be placed on the ballot, Cleaver had to secure 105,000 signatures, which he did easily. Although he only received 200,000 votes nation-wide, this still indicates a broad-range of support for Eldridge Cleaver who was the leader of the Black Panther Party in 1968 (Brisbane, 1974, pp. 213-214). This show of support at the polls is commensurate with attendance at the Black Panthers' rallies, usually around 5,000 people (Austin, 2006, pp. 95, 119). While the BPP may not have

boasted high membership totals, their support and influence within society spanned communities across the nation. At its peak, the organization boasted sixty-six chapters and affiliates, spanning twenty-five states, ranging from California to Connecticut (p. 360). The broad base of support for the Black Panther Party, although not indicated in its membership, can be seen in its ability to involve and incorporate the public in its campaigns.

Government Response

The concrete goals of the Black Panther Party expounded upon in their ten-point program demonstrated the intentions and ends of the movement. The BPP chose methods of violent rhetoric and militant violence in order to accomplish the goals listed in their program. The government's reaction to the rhetoric and demands of the BPP was often to a form of suppression. The suppression of the BPP's violent tactics only resulted in further militant actions by the Party. This cycle of repression and escalation continued without much acquiescence or accommodation.

Huey Newton, the founder and leader of the Black Panther Party demonstrates government response to the Black Panther campaigns. Newton was notorious for threatening violence against police officers. He routinely threatened to draw his weapon on a police officer if the officer dared to draw his gun first (Brisbane, 1974, p. 203). These threats by Newton were accompanied by threats and statements from other segments and leadership of the Black Panther Party. David Hillard, another prominent leader in the BPP, threatened to kill President Nixon. Other threats were made against then-California Governor Ronald Reagan and J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and threats to burn down the White House (Austin, 2006, p. 95). Although the Black Panther Movement did not espouse violence as a measure, they did support "self-defense."

The government's response to these threats of violent action was clearly a form of suppression. Leaders of the Black Panthers were routinely arrested. Hillard was arrested for threatening to kill President Nixon, although charges were later dropped. In 1967, both prominent leaders Huey Newton and Bobby Seale were in prison. The incarceration of leadership resulted in Eldridge Cleaver's ability to redefine the party's direction (Brisbane, 1974, pp. 203-206). The government took the threats of violence by the members of the BPP very seriously. In turn, these leaders were often forced through the judicial process, including arrest, detainment, charges and trials. This became a time consuming process, one which would define the leadership and goals of the Black Panther Party. The "Free Huey" movement, for example, boasted in hundreds of supporters and thousands of dollars raised for Newton's release from prison (Austin, 2006, 119). Not only did the repressive legal actions of the government serve to squash the interests of the BPP, but escalation occurred once the Party created campaigns highlighting the racial injustice of the American legal system towards the Black community, specifically in the unfair treatment of its leaders.

Some argue that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was very involved in investigating the actions of the Black Panther Party. The national government was involved in several commissions, hearings and committees investigating the activities and practices of the Black Panther Party. Both the House and the Senate's committee investigated the Black Panther Party at different times. The motivation for these hearings was largely supplied by the FBI and its counter-intelligence operations, COINTELPRO. As a part of this operation, the FBI, "used surreptitious entry, electronic surveillance, and informants to acquire intelligence, and proceeded to covertly distribute derogatory and scurrilous material to police, Congress, elected officials, other federal agencies, and the mass media" (Drabble, 2008, p. 66). The FBI engaged in such practices in order to create factions within the BPP, as well as to taint the already tarnished

image of the BPPs leaders among politicians, white members of society and members of the moderate Black community already unsupportive of the BPP. This direct government intervention, although subversive, shows the extent of government intervention and repression as a reaction to the Black Panther Party's ideals and goals.

Summary

The rhetoric and militancy of the Black Panthers provided much fodder for the media. Despite its prominence on the public stage, the BPP was never able to overcome its threatening militarized image. Although membership totals were never astounding, the level of participation in the BPP's campaigns provided a significant outlet for those disenchanted with the mainstream Civil Rights Movement. The Black Panther Party certainly garnered a strong response from the government, but this most often came in the form of suppression, rather than accommodation. At the end of the Civil Rights Movement, the BPP had succeeded in progress towards very few of its ten point program and had accomplished none of its goals. While the Black Panthers provided a valuable voice and draw for the youth living in ghetto areas, this movement never grew large enough to bring significant positive response from the government.

South African Anti-Apartheid Movement

Racial inequality has plagued South Africa for centuries. As in many countries in Africa, the colonial legacy of European powers transferred to unequal governmental policies, biased against the black majority of society. In 1948 when the nationalist government was elected in South Africa, policies of legalized segregation and apartheid were enacted. These policies forced relocation of thousands of Africans to ghetto-like camps called townships. Black Africans were required to carry passes and papers at all times to explain their comings and goings. Eventually, their citizenship was even revoked (Marx, 1992, pp. 32-33). The suppression of

Communism Act of 1950 banned political organizations and members of political organization, restricting their movement and forbidding meetings and gatherings of any sort (Mufson, 1990, p. 96). Forced into hiding, members of these political parties became the basis of resistance movements against the Nationalist Government. The African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) became two of the greatest sources of opposition against apartheid policies.

The government in South Africa made a rapid transition from a government equipped with democratic principles to an authoritarian and tyrannical state. The devolution from a democratic to non-democratic state made foreign intervention difficult. Because the South African government still possessed some semblance of legitimate authority, the United Nations expressed hesitancy in any form of intervention in the human rights abuses under apartheid (Spence, 1989, p. 174). State run control of the media outlets followed the suppression of free speech and oppositional political discussions and banning of political parties. Devoid of a free and fair media, the injustices in South Africa remained hidden from international view. Western media outlets sought to investigate and cover the situation in South Africa with their own media outlets. Still, the opposition struggled to share its difficulties with the rest of the world without a platform and means for dispersing their message to the wider population.

International involvement in the anti-apartheid movement called attention to the human rights violations by the Nationalist government. Pressure on the Nationalist government came from international organizations like the United Nations, but also from domestic movements. Countries like Britain and the United States had domestic movements aimed at targeting the government's policies towards South Africa and its government. This pressure coincided with the international stress of the United Nations. Also, international corporations exited South Africa, sharply reducing the nation's flow of capital. American companies like

Texaco, Standard Oil of California, Good Year, General Motors and Ford all faced share holder resolutions, forcing economic boycotts against South Africa on the basis of moral grounds (Price, 1999, p. 66). These organizations were forced to take action in the international economic sphere in order to please the demands from their investors. The international movements included individuals lobbying in their specific area of influence for action against the apartheid movement.

Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement (TAAM)

The transnational anti-apartheid movement utilized tools of non-violence in order to provoke change in South Africa. These non-violent practices often included international sanctions, economic boycotts, and other forms of non-violent contact in order to bring about change. Some nations had individualized movements against apartheid, most significantly being Great Britain. These domestic campaigns would lobby the governments of their home nation to change their policies in relation to South Africa. Other nations joined organizations like the United Nations in condemning policies in South Africa. The UN's campaign focused on putting pressure on the South African government to change, though this movement never resorted to armed conflict or struggle. Instead, non-violent practices of political and economic isolations were the main tools used to combat the Nationalist government in South Africa.

Political sanctions began as a part of the anti-apartheid movement. The United Nation's Charter, replete with language addressing "human rights," was adopted in 1945, three years before apartheid policies were implemented in South Africa. While these policies clearly violated the UN's charter and mission, the organization's Non-Intervention Agreement caused some hesitancy on the part of many international powers (Spence, 1989, p. 177). While many claimed that this policy did not apply because of the violation of human rights in South Africa, the tension still existed. Also, the South African government initially possessed a great enough

semblance of legitimacy to appear to be an independent state (p. 174). Much hesitancy existed in many Western nations as the precedent set by intervention in South Africa. However, the UN passed over 24 resolutions condemning South Africa within the first 15 years of its existence. These resolutions were passed and supported with increasing unanimity (Dubow, 2008, p. 48). Once the Sharpeville massacre occurred in 1960, the UN's practice of mere resolutions shifted towards greater action against the escalating issue in South Africa.

The UN would recommend isolation of South Africa by other nations, officially adopting diplomatic and economic sanctions in 1962. By 1974, South Africa's seat in the United Nations General Assembly was revoked. In 1976, following the Sharpeville Massacre, the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on South Africa (Dubow, 2008, pp. 48-49). These strict measures signaled the disapproval of the international community. The United Nations, often hailed as a representative for international relations demonstrates the importance of this issue to the entirety of the national governments. This discontent with apartheid practices, however, did extend beyond the UN.

The Olympics are often hailed as an opportunity for nations to put aside their differences and compete as a means of fostering national pride and unity. However, following the 1960 games, South Africa was told that its all-white team of athletes was unacceptable. When they did not comply and make necessary changes to the composition of their team, their invitation to the 1964 Tokyo games was retracted. Finally, in 1970, international pressure caused the International Olympic Commission to recognize South Africa's violation of the Olympic Charter, thus expelling South Africa from the Olympic Movement (Rosner and Low, 2009, pp. 39-41). South Africa's expulsion from the Olympic Movement, as well as the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, show the level of commitment and amount of international attention focused on South Africa's problem policy of apartheid.

Media

The absence of a truly free and fair media poses a challenge for understanding the impact of this movement within South Africa. For example, the National Security Management System, introduced in the 1980s, made reporting on resistance activities of all kinds illegal (Price, 1999, p. 254). Because of the difficult media situation in South Africa, organizations like the African National Congress (ANC) moved their media hubs to areas outside of South Africa. Organizations like the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid funded the ANC's anti-apartheid radio programming that reached countries all over the world and South Africa directly. The addition of television in 1975 created greater opportunities for the anti-apartheid movement to broadcast its message to the global public (Thorn, 2007, p. 906). Although the main-stream and state-controlled South African media was difficult for the transnational apartheid movement to access, the international community was largely able to circumvent the system and broadcast anti-apartheid sentiments. The TAAM was able to utilize media for two separate and distinct purposes.

The first goal was to use media to attract attention to the situation in South Africa. This included using the international media network and resources already in place to circulate news and updates on the situation in South Africa. This was often done through more localized and national media products, specific to countries and nations, including national newspapers like the United Kingdoms *The Guardian* in Great Britain and *The Sunday Times* in the United States (Gurney, 2009, p. 475). The ability to utilize pre-established publications lent credibility and the ability for massive distribution to the international community without the censorship and oversight of the Nationalist government in South Africa.

The second goal of the transnational anti-apartheid movement was to make large reservoirs of information, directly relating to the situation in South Africa, readily available to

major news outlets. This included interviews with South Africans living in the apartheid system, relevant facts, information and statistics, as well as photographs of important events.

Specifically, the International Defense and Aid Fund provided video materials to western news organizations attempting to cover the situation in South Africa (Thorn, 2007, pp. 906-908). The TAAM was able to utilize media as a means to broadcast the situation in South Africa, increasing global awareness and relevance.

Membership

In the case of the transnational anti-apartheid movement, discrete membership and participation is difficult to measure. Since the TAAM was not a specific organization, statistics were not kept on membership levels and participation.

Britain is most noted for its strong opposition to apartheid and the movement within its country. The Boycott Movement, which later transformed into the anti-apartheid movement, began in Britain. India also began its national opposition to apartheid very early on. Its first argument to the United Nations came in 1946 (Dubow, 2008, p. 47). The British Anti-Apartheid Movement campaign focused specifically on several areas of non-violent resistance. The primary campaign of awareness concerned the rights of political prisoners and lobbied for international attention and international support for these prisoners. One petition concerning the famous members of ANC leadership accused in the Rivonia trials, boasted almost 200,000 signatures (Klein, 2009, p. 459). This huge show of public support demonstrates the impact of the British campaign's effect on the struggle against the South African government. Also, in 1978, the Anti-Apartheid Movement organized a huge birthday celebration for Nelson Mandela while he was imprisoned in Robben Island. As a part of this birthday campaign, over 3,000 cards were sent to Mandela while in prison. This action, combined with the hundreds of protests organized by the TAAM to coincide with this day, marked a significant show of support for the

TAAM's mission and goals (p. 468). The British national anti-apartheid movement shows the prominence of non-violent international movements both within specific nations, and those operating in the international sphere.

Most forms of political isolation came from international organizations like the United Nations, while individual nations focused on economic sanctions. The United States, for example, began to impose extensive economic restrictions on South Africa. The economic opposition began with individual firms removing their organizations from South Africa. From the 5 year period ranging from 1984-1989, over 184 US firms and an additional 125 international firms removed their operations from South Africa (Price, 1999, p. 225). This more individualized removal of international investments culminated in a cessation of new investments and new capital flow to South Africa by 1986. Direct investments in South Africa, including loans to the South African government and South African companies were banned by the United States, the European Economic Community, the Nordic countries and Japan (p. 224). These sanctions, imposed by over 15 nations, indicated the seriousness of apartheid on a global scale. International powers, like European Economic Community, used investment in South Africa to disqualify three major Swiss banks from a major European loan to Canada (p. 225). The international community began to take economic sanctions very seriously, determined to isolate South Africa from the rest of the international economic sphere.

More than just popular protest, much of the transnational apartheid campaign was implemented through legislation and government intervention. The American campaign against apartheid consisted of economic sanctions, a cessation of aid money and boycott of South African products. Thus, it is difficult to measure the membership and level of participation in these measures because of the institutional nature of the opposition. However, a series of resolutions passed in 1975 stated that Congress would cease both military and economic aid to

a country that was found to have violation of human rights (Walldorf, 2005, pp. 9-10). This policy, specifically aimed at the apartheid government in South Africa, initiated a high standard of conduct for partnering nations. It was not until 1986 that the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was passed in Congress. This measure not only passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate, but also faced a veto from President Reagan. The veto was overridden by 78 votes in the Senate and 313 in the House. This act limited the number of imports from South Africa to the United States, including Uranium and agricultural products and also limited exports including technology, petroleum and munitions (Redden, 1988, p, 596). The passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in spite of the opposition of the Reagan government shows the involvement of members of Congress. The support from Congress signaled almost an 80% approval rating for the act and its measures, a significant portion of the legislature.

Government Response

The case of the transnational anti-apartheid movement is different than the other cases discussed for a very significant reason. The TAAM existed through outside forces and pressure; it was not a movement that resulted from direct governmental oppression. Instead, this movement formed as an external component to apartheid policies. Because of its external nature, South Africa had no control over the international community. Short of starting an international conflict in order to preserve their way of governance, the South African government could not repress the practices of the international community. Because of this different dynamic, the South African government could choose one of two options: acquiesce or ignore. In this instance, the option to repress the opposition must be replaced with ignore because the South African government was not in a position of authority over the international community. Therefore, the model will be modified in this way in this case.

The South African government ignored much of the pressures coming from the international community. The case of the Olympic situation demonstrates this process. Following the 1960 games, South Africa was warned that it must include Black African members as part of its team and could no longer furnish an all white team. The Olympic ban did not prompt any change on the part of the South African government. South Africa's invitation was revoked to 1964 Tokyo games and the 1968 Mexico City games. Further banning still prompted no change on the part of the government. Even when the International Olympic Commission stated that the South African government was in violation of the Olympic Charter and expelled the nation from the Olympic Movement, the government did not change its policies (Rosner and Low, 2009, pp. 39-41). The South African government did not respond to mounting resistance and increasing penalties. Once the government ignored the sanctions set in place by international organizations, the organizations escalated the sanctions, largely to no avail.

The case of economics shows a slightly higher response from the South African government. Following the disappearance of international investments, combined with the early recall of loan payments, South Africa suffered a loss of approximately ten billion dollars (Price, 1999, p. 226). This loss of investment resulted in a widespread spike in unemployment. Approximately 300,000 jobs were lost in the manufacturing sector as a result of these international policies (pp. 232-233). This began a cycle of heightening militant unrest and international pressure. As the unrest increased, so did the international pressure on the government to acquiesce to the requests of the population. The international pressure manifests itself in the form of economic withdrawal, creating further economic difficulties and greater militant unrest (p. 233). This cycle provides escalation for the conflict. Repeated cycles of economic withdrawal and increased unrest only exacerbated the problem long term. The

Nationalist government was compelled to intervene in the situation in attempt to break the cycle of escalation and re-establish international investment in South Africa.

Summary

The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement successfully utilized an international network of resources to bring about swift condemnation of the government in South Africa. International organizations like the United Nations exerted great diplomatic pressure on the South African government. Also, individual movements began nationally lobbying their individual governments to take actions and impose sanctions against South Africa. The combination of national movements and international actions brought significant pressure and attention to the apartheid government in South Africa. These actions, although non-violent in nature, served as an effective deterrent, economically and politically, to the South African government.

Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)

While the African National Congress formed in 1918 to represents the rights and concerns of the native African people living in South Africa, this movement gradually evolved and changed over the span of time. The anti-apartheid movement spanned almost an entire century. The discriminatory practices of color bar and enforcement of a stringent class society based on the external characteristic of race lasted for decades. The African National Congress was the forefront organization providing resistance and support for the anti-apartheid movement. The Pan-African Congress also served as opposition to the apartheid regime with one major difference from the ANC, the racial composition of the organization. The ANC adopted a multi-racial approach, allowing all those affected by the color bar and discriminatory practices to join the resistance. The Pan African Congress felt strongly that only Africans should be involved in the resistance in South Africa, an exclusive approach that further alienated white

members of the population (Lissoni, 2009, p. 188). Individuals like Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu served as leadership in the ANC, well known members of the ANC during the period of anti-apartheid and following the end to the apartheid regime. These well respected leaders formed the basis of the militant arm, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*.

The African National Congress gained importance following the election of the apartheid government in 1948. From then on, the organization provided strategic resistance and support for an opposition movement. Initially the movement was largely non-violent in nature. However, following many cycles of repression and escalation, the apartheid government resorted to violence to suppress the opposition movements and maintain their position of power. The first main instance of government violence came in the form of the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960. In this situation, police forces fired on protesters within the Sharpeville township, killing 69. Outrage spread across the country and the African National Congress began to reevaluate its position of non-violence. Although some leaders opposed a transition to violent resistance, the ANC decided to form its militant branch, *Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)*.

This new militant branch planned to use violent pressure and tactics to undermine the now violent apartheid regime. The ANC was forced into underground operations following the government's ban on organizations like the ANC and the South African Communist Party, as well as the Pan-African Congress. This political maneuver indicated that a litany of public protests, mass demonstrations and boycotts would be a near impossibility. The ANC would have to adapt its practices and procedures to underground support and structure (Suttner, 2003, p. 130). In this way, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* fit well into this clandestine movement. *Umkhonto's* campaigns focused primarily on the destruction of infrastructure through campaigns of sabotage. These campaigns targeted state organizations like pass offices, police stations, economic centers and

court buildings (Legassick, 2003, p. 289). MK hoped that a destruction of infrastructure would lead to the decline and destruction of the Nationalist government in South Africa.

Media

The media in South Africa was largely controlled by white individuals and served the discriminatory interest of the government in control. As such, it was made illegal for reporters to meet with individuals from banned organizations, like the ANC, PAC and MK (Baldauf, 2010, p.1). Since reporters were often prevented from meeting with opposition forces, these individuals did not have opportunities to express their viewpoints and goals. However, reporters did seek to meet with leaders of organizations like the ANC in hopes of publishing opposition perspectives and point of views, although this was highly illegal.

Despite the inability of reporters to meet in one-on-one situations with members of MK leadership, the press still reported on the activities of the ANC and MK. In 1952, prior to the banning of these organizations, media outlets published information regarding the aims and goals of the resistance movement in South Africa. The Southern African popular publication, *Drum*, published the protest manifesto, written by Nelson Mandela, aimed to ignite the defiance campaign against the unjust laws in South Africa (South Africa History Online, 2008). This publication shows the interest of the media in the organization and its practices. Although the media was not independent enough to cover its material in any way it desired, the media did express an interest in interviewing and covering the goals and ideas of the prominent members of organizations like MK.

The media, tainted by the perspective of the apartheid government, did cover the sabotage campaign carried out by *Umkhonto we Sizwe*. The coverage, both in print and broadcast media, labeled the organization and its members as “terrorists,” (Legassick, 2003, p. 295). Although MK did seek to cause damage to state owned infrastructure, its policy sought to

minimize deaths and effects on human lives. Nelson Mandela stated this in the Rivonia Trial. The goal of the MK was to damage the government institutions in South Africa, never to attack or harm people in the process (Mandela, 1965, p. 171). Destruction of state-owned property, not the loss of life, was the intention of *Umkhonto's* campaigns. The media capitalized on the explosions and incidents of sabotage to label MK as a terrorist organization. This coverage of the armed struggle, although unpleasant, displays the importance of media in shaping the image and understanding of *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, its missions and goals.

Membership

Umkhonto we Sizwe was primarily composed of ANC members interested in pursuing more violent means to bring about change from the apartheid government. Although initially the membership was small, the number of recruits increased over time, especially after training became more rigorous. It is difficult, however, to know discrete numbers for membership since the organization operated covertly and was not permitted to work freely in South Africa. Also, membership fluctuated over many years. Following the uprising in the Soweto township in 1976, it is estimated that over 3000 recruits were added to MK's numbers. This number is considered to have tripled the existing membership up to that point in time (Legassick, 2003, p. 286). Several thousand young men belonged to the army of the ANC and trained to complete acts of sabotage throughout the nation.

Following the banning of the ANC and PAC in the 1960s, mass participation in the anti-apartheid movement steadily declined. By the beginning of the 1970s, however, participation in all areas began to increase. This began with the massive worker strikes in Durban and other urban areas. It is estimated that half a million individuals were involved in these strikes (Legassick, 2003, p. 288). This increase in mass struggle also translated into an increase in armed resistance. The number of recruits that entered *Umkhonto* following the unrest in

Soweto was directly correlated to the increase in mass protest at this time. As individuals became more involved in the anti-apartheid movement generally, the specific membership of organizations like MK increased greatly as well. In turn, an increased presence of MK and its missions against the Verwoerd government fuelled the interest of the population in continuing the struggle. This process of action and increased participation served to make the entirety of the anti-apartheid movement stronger as a whole.

Government Response

Although the ANC was active during the anti-apartheid movement, its interactions with the government were strained throughout the entirety of the movement. The apartheid government came to power in 1948 implement its racially discriminatory policies. Then, in an act of tyranny, the Afrikaner government banned political opposition organizations like the ANC and the PAC. This banning forced the organizations to adopt underground. The ANC and its militant branch of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* operated completely covertly (Lissoni, 2009, p. 290). The government's act of banning clearly demonstrates a tactic of repression. The Afrikaner government forbade *Umkhonto* from recruiting and organizing above ground.

Umkhonto did not choose the path of acquiescence. Instead, the MK chose the path of continued resistance and escalation. This cycle repeated over time, with escalation increasing with each new cycle. By 1963, apartheid forces successfully arrested 19 members of ANC leadership and many members of *Umkhonto's* leadership as well (Lissoni, 2009, p. 293). Mandela discusses the famed trial that followed his arrest, the Rivonia Trial, in his personal memoir, *No Easy Walk to Freedom* (1965). In his statement, Mandela admits his involvement with *Umkhonto* and his participation in sabotage as a matter of course (pp. 169-172). Despite the arrest of many influential leaders and their banishment to Robben Island prison, the movement of *Umkhonto* continued. The cycle of repression and escalation would continue.

Summary

Umkhonto's ability to excite the African population and bring cohesion and motivation for the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa served as its greatest accomplishment. The pattern of continual resistance and escalation resulted in the imprisonment of most of *Umkhonto's* leadership. The lack of leadership, combined with the banning measures, served to effectively stifle and significantly hamper the activities of MK. Also, the inability to control the media's coverage and reports greatly restricted its ability to communicate its message ideals and goals. The combination of the State's ban on the organization, the absence of leadership and difficulties in coordination caused difficulties in recruiting members. Due to these several factors, *Umkhonto* was unable to provide significant effective resistance that brought about change from the government. Despite the inability of *Umkhonto's* militarized campaigns to force the government into a position of acquiescence, the strength of the organization lay in its ability to empower the people and serve as a vanguard for resistance against the apartheid government.

Summary

Through the examination of these four resistance movements, The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Black Panther Party, the Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement and *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, several comparisons can be made in the tactics used by each group and the effectiveness of each group. While this does not consist of a comprehensive exploration of the topic and its history, it does demonstrate some trends of significance. Violent movements tend to be less effective at bringing about change in society because of their ability to operate outside of societal institutions, alienating large segments of the population. Non-violent organizations utilize media well to draw sympathy from society, highlighting the injustice of government in order to bring about change in policies and legislation.

Media

An organization able to gain significant and positive media coverage is more likely to gain prominence within the population and clout in lobbying the government. The strength of media coverage manifests itself in the frequency of the coverage and in the content. Even if a plethora of media coverage is generated, if it is negative, it will not serve the group well. Instead, groups seek favorable media coverage to boost their status and position in society. In each of the resistance movements analyzed, the presence or absence of media coverage differed as indicated in Table 1. In the Black Panther Party movement, the media provided copious coverage to the events organized by the BPP, but the content of the coverage was not positive. The tone of media presentation caused a negative opinion of the BPP as a militant organization directly opposing white society (Austin, 2006, p. 91). While the content of media

Table 1 Media Coverage of Resistance Movements			
<i>Case</i>	<i>Free Media</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Media Coverage</i>
Southern Christian Leadership Conference	Yes	Favorable	High
Black Panther Party	Yes	Unfavorable	High
Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement	No	Favorable	Medium
Umkhonto we Sizwe	No	Unfavorable	Low

attention can have an effect on the popularity of an organization, any media coverage can be used as a benefit. Organizations like *Umkhonto we Sizwe* operated under an authoritarian state starved for any significant of media coverage. The absence of a free and fair media industry in South Africa allowed the Nationalist Party government to downplay the actions of *MK* and the effect on society. Instead, any media presented on *Umkhonto* decried the organization as one with terrorist ties, much like the American media's response to the Black Panther Party. Media presence, whether copious or non-existent, is a stronger asset to an organization if the tone of the coverage is favorable.

Favorable media, well utilized as a means of educating the population, can serve as a great indicator of success for opposition organizations . Although the South African state had

strong control over the media outlets in South Africa, the Transnational Anti-Apartheid movement used international media sources, outside of the country to cover their own opposition to the Nationalist Party. The TAAM even gathered information and brought attention to the actions of other anti-apartheid forces in South Africa, elevating the media presence of groups like *Umkhonto we Sizwe*. Differently, in the example of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the presence of the free and fair media greatly aided the cause of the organization. Martin Luther King's ability to publicize the events and protests of the SCLC within the mainstream media outlets aided the organizations cause. Images of police brutality and reports of violence and unrest broadcast across the nation and the world placed pressure on the federal government to respond to the demands of the SCLC (McAdam, 2000, p. 127). The SCLC's ability to garner media coverage, aided to the organization's goals and its position within society. Although McAdam does not specific favorable media coverage as a necessary goal of opposition organizations, the illustration of the cases investigated here, show that favorable media coverage is of greater benefit to an organization than copious, though unfavorable, coverage.

Membership

Resistance organizations must have a base of members in order to function effectively in society. Greater numbers of members signal a greater presence within society. As the popularity of a movement spreads, organizations are often more likely to gain the attention of the media and the government. In the cases discussed, differences in size and membership existed throughout the cases as indicated in the Table 2. Membership levels are difficult to

Table 2: Membership in Resistance Movements	
<i>Case</i>	<i>Membership Levels</i>
Southern Christian Leadership Conference	High
Black Panther Party	Low
Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement	Medium

Umkhonto we Sizwe	Low
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compare because of the various natures of the resistance movements. The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement existed as a cooperative movement spanning a variety of countries, as well as national and international organizations. Other organizations like *MK* and The Black Panther Party kept records of their membership totals. These statistics gave a general understanding of the magnitude of membership, despite the difficulties in measuring membership.

The SCLC and the Black Panther Party were able to operate freely within society, making membership totals much easier to understand. The Black Panther Party was never able to gain a large following, despite its resonance with significant segments of society (Brisbane, 1974, p. 1999). Its membership never surpassed a few hundred, although the organization was able to draw considerable interest from society. This interest never translated into discrete membership totals. The SCLC, on the other hand, was able to operate within in society and capitalize on the interest in order to gain greater membership. Mass demonstrations targeted in specific cities drew a great number of members and participants from areas all across the South. Thousands of individuals not only belonged to members of this group, but also volunteered to participate in campaigns involving harsh treatment, dangerous protests, and voluntary arrest (Fairclough, 1987, pp. 115-120). The participation and membership in the events coordinated by the SCLC enabled significant success in pressuring the government for change. Organizations permitted to operate freely within society face fewer obstacles in gaining membership and a base of support.

Government Response

The goal of political organizations, specifically oppositional organizations, is to bring about a change in policy, practice or legislation from the regime in power. In order for this to

occur, the government must choose to respond favorably to the opposition's request.

Therefore, government response can be a strong indicator of an organization's effectiveness.

Each opposition movement has differing goals and agendas. The success of a movement cannot be gauged on the government's policy decisions alone, but must include the government's direct response to the organization's methods of action. Such analysis must include the organization's specific and expressed goals. Table 3 displays the various level of the government's response to each organization.

Some organizations like the Black Panther Party struggled with getting a response from

Table 3 Government Response to Resistance Movements	
<i>Case</i>	<i>Government's Level of Response</i>
Southern Christian Leadership Conference	High
Black Panther Party	Low
Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement	Medium
Umkhonto we Sizwe	Low

the government. Although the organization protested publicly, the powers at be often responded by silencing the organization through legal measures. Many of the leaders of the BPP were arrested, detained and tried several times (Brisbane, 1974, pp. 206-209). The inability of the BPP's leaders to communicate with the government in a means that brought about change, rather than incarceration, greatly hindered the efficacy of the movement. In a similar fashion, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* was largely able to achieve change through its practices. Because of its status as an illegal organization, members were not allowed in the country. This often resulted in the arrest, detainment, and murder of any members, or suspected members of *Umkhonto* (Mufson, 1990, p. 193). The government's intentional and sustained aggression against MK and its members indicated a lack of positive government response. Progress and change cannot be secured without the government's willingness to change its policies in a response to the opposition's actions.

Other organizations achieved greater levels of success with the government. The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement was able to exert significant international pressure on the nationalist government in South Africa. The combined measures of economic embargoes, boycotts, international sanctions and disciplinary actions, drew a response from the South African government. Because the government could not physically discipline the international community, its only options were to fold to the demands or to ignore the international community. The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement did succeed in drastically altering the government in South Africa (Seidman, 2007, pp. 51-57). This alteration in economic of the status drew a reaction from the Nationalist government. The SCLC was also successful in achieving a government response. Two significant pieces of legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Bill of 1965, served as concrete victories for the SCLC. These laws also followed specific campaigns of SCLC resistance (Fairclough, 1987, p. 250). The SCLC's ability to cause a government response including discrete pieces of legislation signaled a relationship between its action and solutions by the government. An organization's ability to achieve a response from the government signals the organization's efficacy.

Overall Effectiveness

While government response may be a large indicator of an organization's overall effectiveness, it is a combination of several factors that gives the greatest indication of an organization's effectiveness. The combined factors of media coverage, membership totals and government response provide a composite understanding of an organization's ability to bring about change. Table 4 combines these three factors across the four cases investigated. The combination of these factors led to the final conclusion as to whether or not an organization was able to affect change.

Umkhonto we Sizwe ranked as the least effective of all the movements. It received a classification of “low” in each of the three categories measured. Its inability to receive media attention in the national and international sphere, combined with the small number of members in the movement, severely limited the organization’s effectiveness. The legal ban that existed against *Umkhonto* certainly placed several hurdles in the path of efficacy. Despite its guerilla army and its methods of sabotage against governmental institutions and targets, *Umkhonto* was unable to bring about measurable positive change and response from the Nationalist government.

The Black Panther Party tied for a spot as moderately effective. Although the Black Panther Party was unable to secure high levels of membership, its media presence was second to none. The media’s fascination with the BPP greatly contributed to its popularity. While the

Table 4 Overall Effectiveness of Resistance Movements					
<i>Case</i>	<i>Tactic</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>Member-ship</i>	<i>Government Response</i>	<i>Overall Effectiveness</i>
Southern Christian Leadership Conference	Non-Violence	High/Favorable	High	High	High
Black Panther Party	Violence	High/Unfavorable	Low	Low	Low
Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement	Non-Violence	High/Favorable	Medium	Medium	Medium
Umkhonto we Sizwe	Violence	Low/Unfavorable	Low	Low	Low

BPP did not post large numbers for membership, its events and protests gathered large crowds on occasion. However, due to its drastic aims and militant practices, the organization did not gain much ground with the government. Leaders were arrested and tried, the organization was investigated by several commissions and the FBI, no lasting effect was seen from the BPP. The movement did, however, provide an alternative to the non-violent practices of many organizations participating in the Civil Rights Movement and the message of the BPP resounded with many groups within society.

The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement was also ranked as moderately effective. Because of the international status of this movement, the Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement was able to operate externally, without regard to the response of the South African government. With little fear of reprisal, the economic and diplomatic sanctions against the apartheid regime brought international attention and served to foment an international response from the global community. Its ability to use external, pre-established media outlets offered extensive coverage to the injustices occurring in South Africa. Also, its diversity of membership across nations and the world, although not astounding in numbers, brought a multi-faceted approach to combating apartheid. Finally, the crippling economic sanctions put in place provided real consequences for the South African government. These three factors combined enabled the movement to have moderate success in bringing about an end to apartheid in South Africa.

The SCLC was the only organization to achieve the rank of highly effective. The near superstar status of leaders like Martin Luther King lent itself well to many of the factors measured. King's leadership provided much fodder for the media. Images and broadcasts on the nightly news rapidly dispelled information about the SCLC and its latest activities. The SCLC was also able to utilize church congregations throughout the South in order to bolster its membership. Hundreds and thousands of individuals committed themselves to campaigning with the SCLC in each city. The mass popularity of this organization and its activities required a response from the federal government. The publication of horrifying images, combined with the mass participation of the Black population and the connections and status of its leader, Martin Luther King, Jr., brought great success to the SCLC and its cause.

Violent and Non-violent: Rate of Success

One of the most significant differences between the cases investigated here is the type of tactic utilized. Two of the cases operated under a non-violent framework and two cases utilized a violent approach. The question remains as to whether the differences in these tactics produce a difference in results. That is, which tactic is more effective in producing positive government response?

In the violent category, both the Black Panther Party and *Umkhonto we Sizwe* struggled to produce change in governmental policies. In both of these cases, the militant tactics of the organization seemed to produce a violent response from the government. Both organizations had several of its leaders imprisoned for lengthy amounts of time. Members of MK were even killed by government sponsored police forces. Brutality and violence was often met with further violence and suppression. Media attention was largely unfavorable, prohibiting sympathy from the government, as well as other segments of society. *Umkhonto* was rated as low in total efficacy while the Black Panther Party was only rated as moderately successful.

In the non-violent framework, the Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference received a greater response from the government with fewer consequences. The SCLC was able to directly affect two revolutionary pieces of civil rights legislation following its two most successful campaigns. The TAAM was able to drastically affect the economic status of the South African economy, forcing the Nationalist government to face the criticism of the international community. This, combined with the ability to broadcast the horrors of apartheid on a global scale through use of international media, had a great impact on the end of the Nationalist regime. Both of these movements directly effected positive change from their respective governments, despite a difference in magnitude.

Recommendations for Future Research

While this investigation has covered four cases spanning two specific countries, this research is by no means comprehensive. The similarities and differences that exist between the US Civil Rights Movement and the Anti-Apartheid Movement leave opportunity for further discussion. Many cases of violent and non-violent movements exist and could be added to this research for a greater breadth of understanding and allowing for greater generalizability. Investigation into cases from South America and Asia would offer a more comprehensive understanding of this topic, expanding the diversity and scope of movements investigated. Also, further investigation spanning a variety of countries with different governmental structures could offer greater insight into the effectiveness of opposition groups. Investigating different governmental structures would allow the theories and generalizations to apply to governments other than democracies. Both investigating movements in different geographical areas and governments other than democracies would allow for a greater expansion of research.

Also, many factors contribute to the effectiveness of a political opposition group. In this research, I have discussed the relationship of tactics used, media coverage, membership, government response in order to measure the effectiveness of each group. McAdam (2000) cites six significant political aims that are important for political movements. While the three components analyzed in this piece are included in McAdam's goals for political groups, the aims also include maintaining morale for current members, constraining opponents and producing generalized support (p.119). A broader analysis including all of these factors stated by McAdam would provide more comprehensive insight into the ability of each group to be effective and produce change. A stronger investigation into the definition of effectiveness and the factors that relate to becoming an effective movement would add strength to the research. While McAdam offers a list of some aims for political organizations, this list is by no means comprehensive. A stronger investigation into the factors that contribute to effectiveness would allow for more

analysis and depth on this subject. An increased understanding of organizational effectiveness, applied to the analysis of each group

Conclusions

Despite the differences between the United States and South Africa, many differences exist between their resistance movements. The similarities allow for significant comparison and identification of various trends. Although media, membership and government are not the only measures of overall efficacy, these factors do contribute to an understanding of an organization's ability to accomplish its goals. The cases for comparison have offered insight into the question of which is more effective: violent or non-violent tactics.

Violent tactics tend to produce violent responses from the government in power. Unlike non-violent organizations, violent organizations operate outside of the institutions of government, choosing public protest and rhetoric rather than more subtle lobbying and legislation. Because these organizations operate outside the institutions of a government, it is more likely for governments to respond negatively to opposition. Government can react outside of institutions, acting violently or suppressing the demands of the violent group. Also, violent organizations can appear as a threat to the security of the population. In both cases of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* and the Black Panther Party, the government labeled the groups as terrorists. This label did not create sympathy within society. One of the greatest responsibilities of governments at the most base level is the ability to provide security to the governed. In this vein, suppression of violent movements can be justified within society. With the population's sympathy in favor of the government's actions to protect security, rather than the opposition's ability to create a base within the population, violent opposition movements will fail to affect significant change.

Although suppression also happens in non-violent movements, these organizations are able to use the injustice of the state's violence to produce moral sympathy within the population. This sympathy and uncovering of injustice places pressure on the regime in power to change its ways and accommodate the resistance organization and its demands. Because these organizations operate within channels and institutions within society, including the legislative and negotiations processes, it is much more difficult for the government to ignore. Even in cases of legalized segregation and unfair laws imposed by the government in power, these organizations still attempt to operate within legal constraints. In order to maintain legitimacy, the governments must respond reasonably to these perfectly legal protests. This also grants the organizations status as legitimate within the whole of the society. Both of these facets of non-violent operation grants greater success to these organizations.

Overall, non-violent tactics are able to bring about a greater response from the government, thus furthering the efforts of the organization and moving it closer to its goals, whatever they may be. Because opposition organizations must gain sympathy within society, he ability to gather sympathy, rather than anger, allows for greater overall success. Organizations that operate in a militant and terroristic manner outside of society decrease the chance for a favorable response from the government, as well as gaining support and a popular presence within society. The goal of non-violent organizations, more specifically, is to create sympathy from the greater population in order to highlight government injustice and cause a response. Due to this particular goal, the effect of working within institutions lends itself to accomplishing this facet of drawing attention to injustice. Once the population is aware of the injustice, the government is compelled to act in order to maintain its legitimacy and fulfill its constraints to the population. Violent organizations, on the other hand, threaten the strength, stability and legitimacy of the government. In order to protect the population and preserve the best

interests of the people, the government must act against these groups. For these reasons, governments are more likely to accommodate the requests of non-violent organizations and repress the protests of violent groups.

Since non-violent groups seem to have greater success than violent movements, this enables the ability to predict successes and failures of future movements, as well as methods for strengthening resistance. In order for non-violent movements of any sort to be more successful, it is important for the group to draw sympathy from the general population. Although these organizations seek to operate outside of the institutions of society, it is important for violent movements to find alternative means for establishing their own legitimacy as significant and justified resistance to the government. As indicated in the preceding research, using the media to broadcast one's message and goals, especially when linking objectives to specific unjust policies of a government, would dispel many misconceptions of violent organizations as terrorists. Also, delineating between political violence and its purpose, specifically opposed to terrorism, would allow a greater understanding for potential sympathy within society. When a free and fair media exists in a country, violent organizations must utilize the press in order to gain favorable media coverage. Using media sources to capitalize on feelings of alienation and desperation within a group of society will increase the feelings of need for violent resistance. Transparency and honesty will aid in education of society as to the discrete goals and objectives of a specific organization. These characteristics could help to draw a greater base of support within society, as well as increase the number of sympathetic supporters. Therefore, understanding the limitations endemic of violent organizations and movements allows for tailoring one's tactic to become more efficient in effecting change.

Although not comprehensive, the above research details some of the characteristics necessary for political opposition to cause change. The research demonstrates that non-violent

movements are generally superior in bringing about change and a favorable response from the government. However, investigating the strengths and weaknesses endemic of each type of movement allows the ability to tailor tactics for an organization to become more prominent within society. Understanding the weaknesses of violent movements could allow for greater adaptability and success in accomplishing change. Also, if violent movements capitalized on the media and publicity within society, the population could become more educated to the differences between political violence and terrorism. This would bring increasing legitimacy to the tactic of political violence, challenging the typical response of repression from the government. Gathering the understanding of the research presented could result in a paradigm shift in the relationship between the government and political opposition organizations.

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