Work Values: An Integrative Framework and Illustrative Application to Organizational Socialization

Jennifer J. Dose
jdose@messiah.edu

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Jennifer J. Dose
University of Minnesota Morris

Running Head: Work Values

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Jennifer J. Dose
University of Minnesota Morris
Division of Social Sciences
203 Camden Hall
600 East 4th Street
Morris, MN 56267-2134
USA
Telephone: 320-589-6200
FAX: 320-589-6117
Internet: dosejj@cda.mrs.umn.edu
ABSTRACT

This article examines the work values and ethics literatures with the goal of integrating these diverse and independent research streams. The vocational behavior literature and the management and organizational behavior literature on work values, the Protestant Work Ethic construct, and business ethics theory are first reviewed and discussed, demonstrating how insights from these diverse research areas can inform each other. I propose a comprehensive definition of work values and a structural framework that reflects the central elements of the construct and reduces confusion over its conceptual boundaries. The framework consists of a two-by-two dimensional structure, with one continuum ranging from Personal to Social Consensus-type values, and the other axis corresponding to Moral versus Preference values. The contents of each resulting quadrant and the relationships between quadrants are examined. Implications of this proposed structure for organizational socialization are discussed to illustrate its potential application.
Organizational researchers use the term work values to encompass a variety of notions ranging from business ethics to work preferences. Yet there has been little recognition of the numerous distinct, albeit related, meanings and few attempts to study work values as a multidimensional construct (Roberson, 1990).

On a conceptual level, one focus has been on work values as preferences (e.g., Pryor, 1979, 1981) or as derived from needs (e.g., Super, 1973). Other research has focused on work values as a system of ethics. Somewhat surprisingly, the business ethics literature has not typically considered the literature on values, nor has research on the Protestant Work Ethic considered the field of business ethics in general; nevertheless, these fields can inform each other.

This article examines the work values and ethics literatures with the goal of integrating a variety of independent research efforts and providing an organizing framework to guide future research. Although the work values literature is growing, a consistent definition of the construct has not been established. Specifically, the literature tends not to consider the diverse areas of work values, to integrate business ethics research, nor to distinguish adequately between types of values.

To achieve a more integrative and useful typology, a two-by-two dimensional structure denoting preference, moral, social consensus, and personal values is described. This article proposes a comprehensive definition of work values and a structural framework that reflects the central elements of the construct, reduces confusion over conceptual boundaries and provides an integration of theory and research. Finally, to illustrate the relevance of this proposed framework for organizational practice, its application to organizational socialization will be discussed.
Values

A discussion of work values appropriately begins with an examination of the values concept itself. Despite use of the term in a variety of literatures, comparatively little research (Clare & Sanford, 1979) and even less consensus exist concerning what constitutes a value (Borg, 1990; Clare & Sanford, 1979; Kilmann, 1981; Kluckhohn, 1951; Payne, 1980; Rokeach, 1968, 1973; Wiener, 1988). Theorists have alternatively likened values to beliefs (Rokeach, 1968, 1973), needs (Super, 1973), goals (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987), criteria for choosing goals (Locke, 1976), and attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1992; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Certain theorists have taken pains to distinguish values from other constructs (i.e., Kluckhohn, 1951; Payne, 1980; Rokeach, 1973; Scott, 1965). A particularly heated controversy involves whether values are merely preferences (e.g., Rokeach, 1968, 1973) or are preferences that are morally desirable (Beyer, 1981; Kluckhohn, 1951; Scott, 1965).

Most values theorists do agree, however, that values are standards or criteria (Kilmann, 1981; Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach 1968, 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) for choosing goals or guiding action and are relatively enduring and stable over time (England, 1967; Kluckhohn, 1951; Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989; Rokeach, 1968, 1973). Most theorists propose, implicitly or explicitly, that values develop through the influences of culture, society, and personality.

Values theorists argue for the importance of research on values as opposed to attitudes. A value does not correspond to a particular object or situation; whereas, attitudes are attached to specific objects. Values are standards, but attitudes are not. Additionally, individuals have fewer values than attitudes, making values a more economical construct (Rokeach, 1968). Values occupy a
more central position in the cognitive system and personality makeup of individuals, determine attitudes, and are more closely linked to motivation. Finally, the study of values provides the potential for relatively more interdisciplinary collaboration since values play a role throughout the social sciences and management (Rokeach, 1968).

Notwithstanding the debate over the relative merit of or distinctions between values and attitudes, attitude research can still be applied to values specifically. Both can be measured on a continuum from general to specific, with values being more general than attitudes and not corresponding to a particular situation. Values are more consistent than attitudes across both time and circumstance. Like attitudes, values can be learned either through direct experience or influence processes (Fazio & Zanna, 1981). The more experience or knowledge about the object of the attitude or value, the stronger it is. Whereas value research has focused largely on content, attitude research has been based on analyses of psychological processes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1992), specifically attitude change. Thus, the application of attitude research to values would be beneficial since values research is not well-grounded in theory (James, James, & Ashe, 1990).

In sum, although theorists appear to recognize the importance of distinguishing values from other related concepts (Kilmann, 1981; Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Senger, 1971), this task has been less than successful. In fact, one might argue that the continuing dialogue has had the unfortunate consequence of fragmenting the values domain. Nowhere is this fragmentation within the values literature so evident as in its application to work.
An ideal context for exploring human values is the complex work organization (Connor & Becker, 1975). Although interest in work values on both conceptual and practical levels has been increasing (Judge & Bretz, 1992), the topic warrants even greater research attention than it has received (Connor & Becker, 1975; Powell, Posner, & Schmidt, 1984). Work values research has been driven by concern for the motivation level of employees (Brown, 1976) and by recognition of the importance of complementary values among the employee, supervisor, and the rest of the organization (e.g., Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1991). An increasing concern over ethical values has been evident as well (e.g., Payne, 1980; Saul, 1981). Finally, Connor and Becker (1975) have proposed that values have implications for conflict, communication, organizational performance, and managerial actions such as emphasis on goals and types of control.

In spite of the diversity of potential implications, the writings on work values suffer from the same lack of consensus regarding definition and conceptualization as do those on values in general. As a result, research efforts are often fragmented, involving narrow foci. Most important, although not recognized explicitly (as it is in general values theory), the theoretical distinction as to whether work values are merely preferences or have an additional element of what should be preferred remains unresolved. A further complication concerns whether this "ought-should" element relates only to moral values (Berger, Olson, & Boudreau, 1983; Kilmann, 1981; Kluckhohn, 1951; Scott, 1965) or to socially determined values as well (Locke, 1976; Ravlin & Meglino, 1987; Rokeach, 1968; Schein, 1985). By itself, each of these foci is incomplete, as will be discussed later.

Work Values and Vocational Behavior
Work values have been investigated as preferences for the type of work or work environment individuals would like or consider important in job decisions (e.g., Lofquist & Dawis, 1971; Pryor, 1979, 1981; Super, 1973). Thus, Zytowski (1970) defined work values as "a set of concepts which mediate between the person's affective orientation and classes of external objects offering similar satisfaction" (p. 176).

Typical areas of investigation are values vis-à-vis job satisfaction (e.g., Butler, 1983; Drummond & Stoddard, 1991) and career choice (e.g., Ben-Shem & Avi-Itzhak, 1991). Three research programs have presented conceptualizations of work values and developed instruments that measure what they define as the work values domain.

**Super: Vocational Work Values.** According to Super (1973), values derive from needs and are more general than interests. Work values are goals that one seeks to attain to satisfy a need; they may be satisfied by more than one kind of activity or occupation. Super's Work Values Inventory (WVI; Super, 1970) is arguably the best known instrument for assessing values in terms of vocational behavior, mostly using student samples. O'Connor and Kinnane (1961) identify six factors in the WVI: material success, altruism, conditions and associates, heuristic-creative, achievement-prestige, and independence-variety. More recently, Super has developed the Values Scale (Nevill & Super, 1989), an American version of the Work Importance Study (WIS, 1980), which measures twenty-one vocational values; however, this inventory has not received as much attention as the WVI.

**Lofquist and Dawis: Importance.** Lofquist and Dawis (1971) have conceived of values as needs which are grouped according to their underlying commonalities. Their Minnesota Importance Questionnaire (MIQ; Gay, Weiss, Hendel, Dawis, &
Lofquist, 1971) conceptualizes values along a dimension of importance (Lofquist & Dawis, 1978) much like Super's WVI. The factor structure of the MIQ shows six values: safety, autonomy, comfort, altruism, achievement, and aggrandizement.

**Pryor: Work Preferences.** Pryor adopted the term "preferences" because he viewed work values as being concerned with what individuals like or prefer in a job instead of what they think is good or ought to be done. Often these two elements will coincide, but this is not necessarily the case; individuals' moral attitudes will seldom account for all of their preferences related to the nature of work (Pryor, 1979). Pryor (1979) does not distinguish interests from preferences; however, work aspect preferences are distinguished from vocational preferences (Pryor, 1981). Pryor (1979) does not limit the number of conceivable work aspect preferences; there are as many as there are work aspects. He does, however, distinguish twelve factors in his Work Values Preference Scale (WAPS; Pryor, 1979; 1981): security, self development, altruism, life style, physical activity, detachment, independence, prestige, management, coworkers, creativity, and money (Pryor, 1981). Pryor (1990) found work aspect preferences to be stable according to response pattern, hierarchy of choice, and factor pattern.

**Integration.** Although defined differently in the sense of being equated with goals (Super), needs (Lofquist and Dawis), or preferences (Pryor), these measures appear to be assessing similar constructs. Possessing a certain value or set of values leads individuals to seek jobs characterized by certain attributes. Among the handful of studies that compare more than one model, Pryor (1982) acknowledges the need for conceptual integration and compares a cluster analysis of his Work Aspect Preference Scale to factors derived from other scales, finding some
similarities. He did not compare the scales to each other empirically, however.

Macnab & Fitzsimmons (1987) conducted a multitrait-multimethod study of the Minnesota Importance Questionnaire (Lofquist & Dawis, 1971), the Work Values Inventory (Super, 1970), the Canadian version of the Values Survey (WIS, 1980) and the Work Aspect Preference Scale (Pryor, 1979). A confirmatory factor analysis found eight factors: authority, co-workers, creativity, independence, security, altruism, work conditions, and prestige. Convergent and discriminant validity analysis indicated that for these eight "traits," the different scales measured very similar constructs. It is unfortunate that this similarity is not more widely recognized and utilized. Not only are these similarities relevant, but largely uninvestigated differences from other types of values will become important as the organizing framework of work values is built.

Values Concerning Work Behavior

In contrast to research in vocational behavior, which views values as preferences with no moral or social desirability connotation, some research in the management and organizational behavior literature views values systems as possibly but not necessarily having a moral element.

England: Personal Values Questionnaire. England's (1967) personal value system was developed specifically for the work environment, and is viewed as a relatively permanent perceptual framework that shapes and influences one's behavior. England conceived of values as ideologies or philosophies (England, 1967; England, Dhingra, & Agarwal, 1974) that enable understanding of individuals' behavior at work. The importance of values lies in their relation to a manager's interpersonal relations, ethics, and perception of and solutions to problems. The Personal Values
Questionnaire was constructed of sixty-six concepts relevant to major belief systems and behavior in organizations; these were grouped into five classes: goals of business organizations, personal goals of individuals, groups of people, ideas associated with people, and ideas about general topics. Based in part on the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values (1960), responses are scaled both according to power (importance) and why the value was deemed important; dimensions are: pragmatic (idealism vs. practicality; "successful"), ethical-moral ("right"), or affect-oriented ("pleasant").

Ravlin and Meglino: Behavior Preferences. Ravlin, Meglino, and their colleagues (Meglino et al., 1989, 1991; Ravlin & Meglino, 1987, 1989) define work values as preferences for various socially desirable modes of work behavior, which thus "ought" to be displayed (Ravlin & Meglino, 1989). Meglino, Ravlin and their colleagues appear to contend that work values are general orientations that can be displayed in all work settings. Developed using a critical incidents techniques, the Comparative Emphasis Scale (Cornelius, Ullman, Meglino, Czajka, & McNeely, 1985) assesses achievement, concern for others, honesty, and fairness. Researchers using this view of work values have initiated a program of research that considers aspects of work values measurement such as social desirability and hierarchy (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987, 1989) as well as the relationship of work values to other constructs such as perception and decision making (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987), corporate culture (Meglino et al., 1989), leader satisfaction (Meglino et al., 1991), and job choice (Judge & Bretz, 1992).

Importance of Outcomes. Rather than focusing on a value system, some research has investigated individual values by measuring the importance individuals give to a particular outcome. Much of this line of research is based on Locke's (1976)
conception of work values, which states that values are what one desires or seeks to attain, and are learned rather than innate. According to Locke (1976), individuals differ in what they value, and this determines their choices and affective reactions. Research topics focus on job satisfaction (e.g., Berger et al., 1983; Butler, 1983), commitment (e.g., Mottaz, 1988; Oliver, 1990), organizational choice (e.g., Bar-Ilan & Ramat-Gan, 1982), and participation (Knoop, 1991). Researchers commonly devise their own lists of outcomes; therefore, the lists are not consistent across studies. Unfortunately, this makes comparison of results across studies difficult.

The Significance of Work

In contrast to preferences for types of work (values such as those investigated in the vocational literature), several research streams have investigated the extent to which work itself has significance for people and what that significance is. Much research has focused on the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) and, to a lesser extent, other so-called "ethics". The Meaning of Working study (MOW International Research Team) most explicitly discusses work values in terms of its significance.

Protestant Work Ethic. Weber (1958) proposed that the Protestant Work Ethic provided the moral justification for the accumulation of wealth (and thus fueled capitalism). According to Weber's view of Protestant theology, work is a divine calling and must therefore be done to the glory of God; worldly success is a sign of grace. Characteristics of individuals subscribing to the PWE include industriousness, self-discipline, asceticism, and individualism (Feather, 1984; Wollack, Goodale, Witjing, and Smith, 1971). Although Weber's interpretation of Protestant theology and its connection to capitalism has been criticized (Furnham, 1984), psychologists remain interested in characteristics of individuals who
subscribe to this ethic and in correlations with other attitudes and behaviors. Psychological investigation of the work ethic, therefore, has become somewhat independent of PWE beliefs as described by Weber.

Three measures of the PWE construct have been proposed and used relatively frequently in research. The Protestant Ethic Scale (Mirels & Garrett, 1971), view PWE as a personality variable. Blood (1969) theorized that how individuals view work in general should be related to attitudes toward their particular jobs; his measure is comprised of a pro-Protestant ethic scale and a less frequently used non-Protestant ethic scale. Like Blood (1969), Wollack et al. (1971) proposed an index that corresponds to individuals' views toward work in general rather than to a specific job. The Survey of Work Values contains six scales: activity preference, job involvement, pride in work, attitude toward earnings, social status, and upward striving.

Research has found scores on various measures of the Protestant Work Ethic to be related to job satisfaction (e.g., Blood, 1969; Stone, 1976), job involvement (e.g., Shove, Thornton, & Shove, 1990), organizational commitment (e.g., Kidron, 1984; Shove et al., 1990), career salience (Shove, et al., 1990), and leader-member exchange (Steiner, 1988). Comparative research conducted on PWE measures found the Protestant Ethic Scale (Mirels & Garrett, 1971), the pro-Protestant Ethic Scale (Blood, 1969), and the intrinsic scales of the Survey of Work Values (Wollack et al., 1971) to be positively correlated (Waters & Zakrajsek, 1991).

Other "Ethics". Although Nord et al. (1988) overestimated the impact of the PWE on organizational behaviorists' conceptions of work, their point is well-taken that a focus only on this construct overlooks alternate end states that individuals might desire. In fact, the PWE has been compared to other value systems
such as the organizational belief system (work has value for how it serves group interests and contributes to one's success), the humanistic belief system (work is important for individual growth and development and this is more important than work output), the leisure ethic (work is only valued as a means to provide leisure; human fulfillment is found in leisure activities) and Marxist-related beliefs (e.g., Buchholz, 1978). The five systems are distinct from each other: Furnham and Rose (1987) found PWE to be negatively correlated to the leisure and welfare ethics and uncorrelated with the wealth ethic.

The Meaning of Working. The Meaning of Working study (MOW, 1987; Claes & Ruiz-Quintanilla, 1994; England & Whitely, 1990; Ruiz-Quintanilla, 1990) is a cross-national exploration of individuals' perceptions about working itself (as opposed to a particular job). The variables in the study which are most directly related to the present discussion of work values include work centrality, the view of work as either an entitlement or an obligation, and the cognitive centrality, dependence, and criticality of valued work outcomes. Based on the results of interviews, MOW researchers developed several patterns according to combinations of these variables. These patterns have been discussed in terms of their relative frequency within and across the national samples.

Just as with work values related to vocational behavior, the set of values discussed above shares some important similarities. Although values related to the Meaning of Working study have not been labeled "ethics" as have the Protestant Work Ethic or leisure ethic, they share some important parallels. These authors tend to use the term "ethic" in the sense of a system of values about what meaning work has and how it is related to human fulfillment. The five systems of "ethics"
discussed above may bear some relation to the patterns of work meaning discussed in the MOW (1987) study.

Business Ethics as a Value System

Although the work values literature has tended to focus on attitudinal correlates, a considerable portion of the business ethics literature has emphasized how individuals establish criteria for an ethical/moral decision and how this influences decision making behavior (Brady, 1986; Jones, 1991; Treviño, 1986). An ethic is a value system. As such, although seldom explicitly discussing values per se, the business ethics literature can be useful in informing a discussion of values. As part of his agenda for ethics research, Kahn (1990) cites the importance of tying together concepts from various disciplines. Indeed, management and the social sciences have much to offer each other in developing the area of values and ethics.

Webster's Dictionary defines ethics as (1) a discipline dealing with what is good and bad or with moral duty and obligation; and (2) a group of moral principles or set of values. Ethics theorists disagree, however, on the extent to which the field of ethics describes how people do express their values in choosing courses of action or prescribes what values and courses of action should be taken (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994). Thus, a conceptual gap exists between prescriptive standards for ethical behavior and descriptive situational and personal contexts (Kahn, 1990). According to some proponents, ethical theory "seeks the principles that will tell us the right thing to do, or what things are worth doing" (Jansen & Von Glinow, 1985, p. 816). Although these definitions imply that there are some objective criteria for determining the "rightness" of an ethical values system, most researchers focus on descriptive investigation of ethical values and behavior.
through questionnaires or scenarios (Ford & Richardson, 1994). Only a minority (e.g., Carroll, 1979; Saul, 1981) give prescriptive views. Additionally, the focus is not, for the most part, on the content of values systems (i.e., what is right or wrong), but rather on how that content is determined (e.g., Brady, 1985, 1986; Jones, 1991) or what influences the development of ethical value systems (e.g., Treviño, 1986).

Theorizing in the area of prescriptive guidelines for an ethical values system has been founded largely on the classic philosophical bases for ethics (Cavanagh, Moberg, & Velasquez, 1981; Fritzsche & Becker, 1984; Gatewood & Carroll, 1991): utilitarian theories, theories of rights, and theories of justice. In the utilitarian approach, the act or rule for behavior chosen leads to the greatest social good. Rights theories guide values to ensure individual rights such as due process, free speech, privacy, and consent. Finally, the theory of justice calls for values of equity, fairness, and impartiality. These theories can be summed up in terms of the distinction between adhering to principle, maximizing individual interests, and maximizing joint interests (Victor & Cullen, 1988). Often what constitutes legitimate means and ends are conflicting and unclear (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992); thus, the criteria these theories employ may often conflict with each other.

Saul (1981) has attempted to reduce the ambiguity of prescriptive guidelines such as these by suggesting a principle whereby personal interests are subordinate to company interests which are, in turn, subordinate to societal interests.

Turning to models of how individuals establish decision criteria, classical ethics theory offers two seemingly conflicting models: formalism, which emphasizes an ethic developed through tradition and precedent; and utilitarianism, which emphasizes results and innovation (Brady, 1985, 1986). Note that this is distinct
from the utilitarianism discussed above; here, values are based on outcomes received by a decision maker with no criteria given for a "good" outcome. Brady argues that in many instances, both formalism and utilitarianism are useful in forming principles or values for action. Brady does not, however, discuss why criteria based on precedent should be valued or what the criteria for evaluating consequences should be.

Situational characteristics also have been investigated with regard to ethics, and have implications for values. Organizational climate (Payne, 1980; Victor & Cullen, 1988) and culture (Treviño, 1986; Gatewood & Carroll, 1991; Schein, 1985; Schneider, 1990), which is defined as the shared assumptions, values, and beliefs of organizational members (Treviño, 1986), have been widely associated with ethics and values. Clear norms about appropriate behavior shape values and help individuals judge what is appropriate in a given situation. Significant others such as mentors or authority figures can model values. Finally, a formal code of ethics can influence the ethical values employees hold. In addition to organizational standards for ethics and values, the legal system, society's code of ethics, and professional standards constitute influences as well (Gatewood & Carroll, 1991). Choices of ethical values and subsequent behavior also may be affected by individual difference variables such as cognitive moral development (Treviño, 1986; Victor & Cullen, 1988), ego strength (Treviño, 1986), field dependence (Treviño, 1986), and locus of control (Jones, 1991; Treviño, 1986).

The Fragmented State of the Work Values Concept

The preceding sections highlighted the varying conceptions of work values, content foci, and the ways in which work values have been classified. Several
overall comments can be made regarding the state of the field. First, similarities of approaches within research areas are largely ignored (e.g., common factors shared by the WVI, VS, MIQ, and WAPS vocational choice instruments and positive correlations of PWE measures). Further investigation and recognition of the extent to which scales assess the same or similar constructs, as well as exploration of whether the instruments have similar relationships with criterion variables such as job satisfaction (in the case of Protestant Work Ethic scales), or occupational choice (in the case of the WAPS, MIQ, WVI, and VS) is a laudable goal.

Secondly, relationships across various foci of work values are largely neglected as well. Research domains, such as vocational behavior, have focused on values determined by individual preference, while other areas, such as business ethics, emphasize values as resulting from the normative influence of society. Various foci such as the Protestant Work Ethic, preferences for work environment, managerial values, individual versus organizational perspectives, and cross-cultural content must be investigated to elucidate the relationships between them and to shed light on the work values construct in general. Still, some investigation of relationships between foci do exist. Ravlin and Meglino (1987) found that those scoring low on the Pro-Protestant Ethic scale (Blood, 1969) rank Achievement as less important. High scoring individuals on the Protestant Ethic Scale (Mirels & Garrett, 1971) are also likely to be high in conservatism and to assign more importance to the Rokeach Value Survey items of salvation, obedience, self-control, sense of accomplishment, and social recognition (Feather, 1984).

In terms of content, the difficulty of assessing the boundaries of the work values domain, particularly in cross-cultural research, should also be noted. Researchers must therefore remain open to new variables. Scales that are based
on critical incidents, such as used by Ravlin, Meglino, and their colleagues (Cornelius et al., 1985), rather than being formed a priori, are well suited for this purpose. For the sake of comparability across studies, however, greater consistency in measurement should be practiced, rather than using a unique list of importance ratings for each study.

In addition to the narrow focus on content, very little research has involved dimensions into which the content can be classified. One exception is the work of Elizur (1984) which was extended by Borg (1990). Elizur defined the work values construct according to two facets: Modality of outcome and Relation to performance. No attempt was made to define the limits of the work values domain. A further problem with this use of facet theory to provide dimensional structure for work values is that although work values have usually been considered as composites of different facet elements (Borg, 1990), this is, in fact, contradictory to facet theory since facets must be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive in the context of a particular domain (Dancer, 1990).

In many ways, various perspectives on work values are like the proverbial blind men attempting to describe an elephant: theorists have concentrated on particular areas of the work values content domain, acknowledging little overlap or relationship between content areas, and proposing different definitions of work values. Due to its fragmented nature, the topic of work values would benefit from a framework that more fully considers both content and structure.

A Framework for Work Values

A good definition of the work values would include all conceptualizations and research which are relevant to the construct, yet will distinguish work values from other constructs. As noted, there is no widely accepted definition of work
values (Pryor, 1981; Zytowski, 1970). I propose the following definition based on logic and previous theory: Work values are evaluative standards relating to work or the work environment by which individuals discern what is "right" or assess the importance of preferences. Some work values may also have a degree of social consensus about whether they should be subscribed to, while other values are seen to be equally acceptable according to the choice of each individual. This definition utilizes the dominant view of values as standards (e.g., Kilmann, 1981; Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1968), but also recognizes that work values may be classified according to certain properties.

A concept's central elements must be reflected in any dimensional structure (Wiener, 1988). I propose that work values will vary along two dimensions: 1) whether the value held exhibits a moral element, and 2) the degree of social consensus regarding the importance or desirability of the particular value. The moral component expresses a standard that distinguishes whether something is right or wrong; alternatively, values may simply be preferences for which there is no moral aspect. The extent to which the value possesses an evaluative (should-ought) element has been extensively debated in the context of the definition of values; however, I contend that both preferences and conceptions of what is right and wrong fall within the boundaries of the values construct along the personal-social consensus continuum. Within the range of preferences, some values are more widely viewed as desirable; there is greater social consensus on their desirability. Values do not always coincide with those of a social group, however. Thus, values may be held personally or socially and may or may not have a moral element.

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Insert Figure 1 about here
This framework is in some ways an extension of the instrumental and terminal dimensions used in Rokeach's (1973) Values Survey with some important differences. For Rokeach, a single value could not be classified along both dimensions. Only instrumental values could be moral or competence values and only terminal values could be personal or social. Since many of Rokeach's instrumental and terminal values are related (e.g., Loving and Mature Love) or could be changed from instrumental to terminal by changing the part of speech (e.g., independent to independence), a two-by-two classification provides a more precise yet parsimonious structure. Additionally, scales in the work values literature do not distinguish between instrumental and terminal values. The term "preferences" more nearly describes the opposite of moral values, distinguishing standards that denote right and wrong from those that do not.

Moral Versus Preference Values

The attitude literature has proposed the need for distinction between moral obligation and personal preference (Gorsuch & Ortberg, 1983). This distinction has particular relevance for work values since some values (and corresponding decisions) have moral considerations while others are merely preferences without moral implications. Work values are moral to the extent that they follow standards of right and wrong such as the theories of rights, justice, and utilitarianism (Cavanagh et al., 1981) or Saul's (1981) ethical guidelines. Moral values may be held consensually or individually. Values that include standards of importance or liking, but no element of right and wrong, are classified as preferences. Previous literature has not recognized this important distinction (e.g., England et al., 1974; Gatewood and Carroll, 1991; Kahn, 1990). England, for example, pointed
to the conceptual nature of values as a continuum between preferential approaches and normative approaches; his term "normative" includes both moral and socially desirable values. Moral values are likely to be more strongly internalized than are socially influenced values in general. The idea that perceptions of the self include a sense of duty or obligation is an important one (Higgins, 1987; Scott, 1965).

**Social Consensus**

Social consensus values are those which members of a certain culture agree are relatively important, not only for themselves but for others as well. Clearly, no value is universally advocated or advocated to the same degree; this is why social consensus and personal values do not form a dichotomy. In contrast to personal values, which are based on or chosen largely due to personal experience, social consensus values are more often learned due to the influence of others (Fazio & Zanna, 1981). Greater social consensus may also lead to greater attempts to influence individuals toward the majority view. In the moral range, there is likely to be social influence informing individuals of the standards of what is "right."

A large portion of the work values literature discusses the social construction of values. Culturally shared understandings play a role in defining what is valued (Scott, 1965). The social environment or context affects construction of meaning by providing a guide to socially acceptable beliefs and focusing individuals' attention on particular stimuli (England, 1967; England et al., 1974; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Shared values are indicative of an organizational or even national culture (Hofstede, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Meglino et al., 1989; Schein, 1985; Treviño, 1986). Social norms are necessary for the establishment of an ethical
climate (Payne, 1980; Victor & Cullen, 1988). Social learning theory (Bandura, 1977) implies that appropriate work values are modeled in the organizational setting (Weiss, 1978), and that work values can be modified as individuals are socialized (Berger et al., 1983; Connor & Becker, 1975; Weiss, 1978). Social consensus is an important factor in moral decisions (Jones, 1991); values used in decision making include not only the personal values of the decision maker, but also values of those to whom the decision maker must respond (Beyer, 1981).

It should be recognized that advocating certain values does not mean adherence necessarily follows. Although altruism is highly regarded, for example, it is not always practiced. The attitude literature has extensively investigated the relationship between attitudes and behavior; although a review of that research is peripheral to the present discussion, it would be relevant to future investigations of the relationship between attitudes and values.

**Personal Values**

Not all work values are socially determined, however, or have equivalent social desirability (Ravlin & Meglino, 1989). This idea is evidenced by two areas of the values literature: work preferences and value conflict. Types of work desired (Super, 1973), preferences for aspects of work (Pryor, 1979), or generally what individuals perceive to be important about their work environment and work outcomes (Locke, 1976; Lofquist & Dawis, 1971), constitute different but equally worthwhile alternatives. Additionally, work values have been found to have a genetic component (Keller, Bouchard, Arvey, Segal, & Dawis, 1992), thus not socially influenced. Finally, only the altruism and independence scales of Super's Work Values Inventory (Super & Mowry, 1962) and Pryor's Work Aspects Preference Scales (Pryor, 1983) were susceptible to social desirability effects. Therefore, rather
than treating social desirability as a measurement problem, it may be more fruitful to consider the degree of social desirability as an indicator of the extent to which the value is socially determined or part of a shared culture (Zerbe & Paulus, 1987).

The existence of value conflict also implies that all work values do not possess the same degree of social consensus. Values are personal; thus, points of interface between individuals with different values can create conflict (Brown, 1976; Connor & Becker, 1975; Senger, 1971). Although the ethics literature cites the importance of organizational and societal normative values (e.g., Saul, 1981), agreement on appropriate values is far from universal (Katz & Khan, 1978; Payne, 1980). The ethics literature posits that people may have several sets of moral codes—as many as they may have influential social groups (Beyer, 1981; Strother, 1976). The key reference group is likely to be the one which is most salient in that situation, perhaps due to proximity or reward power. Different groups of organizational stakeholders may have different values systems; ethics may conflict resulting in ambivalence or pluralism (Jansen & Von Glinow, 1985; Payne, 1980; Payne & Giacalone, 1990; Tetlock, 1986). Again, although there is a certain degree of congruence among social groups, the desirability of certain values is hardly universal. Finally, personal ethical standards may differ from those of the organization, resulting in conflict as well (Treviño, 1986). Whistleblowing is a good illustration of behavior influenced by this type of value conflict—even though the salient reference group holds certain values, the individual chooses not to act in accordance with them. Violation of normative values in any sense makes a case for personal determination of values (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Payne, 1980; Payne & Giacalone, 1990).

Integration of Structure and Content: A Two-By-Two Diagram
Social-Moral Quadrant

Based on the proposed dimensional structure, conceptions of values and ethics can each be placed into one of the four quadrants. Many values systems proposed by the business ethics literature occupy the social-moral quadrant. As ethics, they are principles concerning moral duty. Organizational ethics codes, professional codes, and legal codes are all socially determined value systems with a moral component dictating what is "right." An ethical climate is also a socially shared system. Formalism is an ethic based on tradition and precedent; thus, it also contains an element of social consensus. Theories of rights, justice and utilitarianism (Cavanagh et al., 1981), and England's moral-ethical value system are placed in this quadrant when held by social consensus. The humanistic belief system (e.g., Buchholz, 1978) is also socially determined and dictates that work "ought" to be for individual growth. Finally, both Nord et al. (1988) and Blood (1969; Hulin & Blood, 1968) conceived of the Protestant Work Ethic as socially and culturally determined.

Personal-Moral Quadrant

Personal moral codes lie within the Personal-Moral quadrant. Whistleblowing, for example, would involve a personal moral obligation that opposes the social consensus of the organization. Although individuals' personal values will often reflect social consensus, this is not necessarily the case (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1967). Individuals may hold ethics of rights, justice, or utilitarianism (Cavanagh et al., 1981) that are not shared by the organization (or vice versa). Personal moral codes are emphasized when the values of the organization do not conform to the values the individual deems important. Mirels and Garrett (1971) conceptualized the Protestant Work Ethic as a personality variable, thus not under social influence,
and Wollack et al. (1971) declared no position. Finally, since Keller et al. (1992) postulated a genetic factor in work preferences, a further research question is the possibility of a genetic personal-moral component.

Personal-Preference Quadrant

The vocational behavior literature on work preferences (Lofquist & Dawis, 1978; Pryor, 1979; Super, 1973; Nevill & Super, 1989) falls primarily in this quadrant. The body of research that simply asks for ratings of what individuals find important belongs here as well. What individuals like or judge to be important varies by individual, and, except for two values, has not been found to exhibit social desirability. The leisure "ethic" (e.g., Buchholz, 1978) has no socially desirable or moral component; thus, it fits in this quadrant as well. As personal preferences, England's (1967) aesthetic or affective values also belong here. Finally, the meaning individuals ascribe to working (MOW, 1987) is derived from both personal experience and social influence; however, lack of agreement across individuals and the greater role played by personal experience advocate for placing it on the Personal side of the Personal-Social continuum.

Social-Preference Quadrant

These values are consensually viewed as being desirable but impose no moral standard. Often the goal is success, as in Brady's (1985) concept of utilitarianism and England's (1967) pragmatic values. Super (1973) and Pryor's (1979) altruism and individualism scales were found to have a social desirability component. Ravlin & Meglino's (1987) values are seen as socially desirable as well. The organizational and Marxist-related belief systems (Buchholz, 1978) are shared consensually, but are concerned with achieving success or control rather than meeting any moral standard. Finally, as culturally determined values with no moral content,
Hofstede's (1984) power distance, individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity values should be included here.

**Relationships Between the Quadrants and Directions for Future Research**

The personal-social consensus dimension is not a dichotomy but a continuum: values domains may be closer or further from the center. The degree to which the values is consensually seen as socially desirable determines whether it falls on the personal or social consensus end. A hypothesized genetic component of moral values would, of course, fall on the personal end. The extent to which the Protestant Work Ethic is a socially desirable or personality variable is a question open to further research, but it may likely have both personal and social influences, thus falling closer to the midpoint within the personal-moral quadrant.

Although individuals often have a personal code of ethics, perhaps with the same content as one in the social-moral quadrant, the difference is that they hold these personal codes in the absence of social influence. Ethics need not be externally induced (Wallach & Wallach, 1990). Therefore, a particular point of interest occurs when the personal code is in conflict with organizational or societal normative values. Socialization, high self-monitoring, and field dependence may all predict social rather than personal determinants of ethical codes. In contrast, individuals with an internal locus of control or high ego strength would be more likely to act according to personal values. Individuals' moral development may also be a factor (Treviño, 1986), particularly if an individual's stage of moral development is at odds with the organization's ethical climate. The presence of referent individuals or salient evidence of a particular value may enhance adherence to the social consensus (Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). Another question for future research concerns the value pluralism resulting when societal and
organizational value systems are not congruent, and how the employee tries to resolve this conflict.

Turning to the preference side of the personal-social continuum, preferences do not all have the same degree of social desirability. Even within the same instrument, some preferences have a social desirability component while others do not (Pryor, 1979; Super, 1973). A potential research question involves how people choose between socially desirable values. Perhaps personal values determine the hierarchy.

The distinction between moral and preference values concerns whether the value corresponds to something liked or if it is attached to an obligation to do what is right. Thus, England's (1967) pragmatic values are often preferred because they lead to success, whereas values of justice may be held because they contain a moral component. Factors of the Comparative Emphasis Scale (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987) and Super (1973) and Pryor's (1979) altruism and individualism factors are not classified as moral values because these instruments assess values that are important preferences, not distinctions between right and wrong.

A benefit of this proposed structure is that by integrating work values models, it is possible to determine what future research would be beneficial. The small amount of research investigating more than one conception of work values (i.e., Macnab & Fitzsimmons, 1987; Pryor, 1982), has primarily examined measures to determine if various scales are actually assessing the same construct. Future research to test the model should take two directions. First, a more parsimonious view of values content can be established by studies similar to that of Macnab and Fitzsimmons (1987). Second, comparison of values across quadrants can help determine if using values from more than one quadrant can enhance prediction of
other variables such as job satisfaction or organizational commitment. The only study to consider work values in more than one quadrant was Ravlin & Meglino's (1987) comparison of the Protestant Work Ethic with other variables. Several instruments also have been used to predict organizational commitment, including ratings of importance of work outcomes and the Protestant Ethic Scale (Mirels & Garrett, 1971); research would profit from investigating these types of work values concurrently.

An Illustrative Application: Organizational Socialization

Although this framework for work values has implications for many aspects of organizational theory, one particularly appropriate example concerns organizational socialization. Socialization is "the process by which a new member learns and adapts to the value system, the norms, and the required behavior patterns of an organization, society, or group" (Schein, 1968, p. 1). The organizational socialization literature has discussed stage models of socialization (e.g., Wanous, 1980), tactics organizations use to inculcate new members (e.g., Van Maanen & Schein, 1979), and socialization processes such as sensemaking (e.g., Louis, 1980) and newcomer proaction (e.g., Morrison, 1993; Reichers, 1987), but has not focused extensively on these stages or tactics relative to the type of information organizations wish newcomers (or newcomers wish themselves) to learn.

Work Values and Organizational Socialization

Work values are but one facet of organizational life that new employees must learn; nevertheless, shared values represent a significant element of organizational culture (Schein, 1985; Wiener, 1983). The values component, however, has been relatively neglected in socialization research. Thus, it is proposed that the framework of work values can shed light on research needs relating to how and in
what circumstances newcomers will adopt the values of their organization or work group.

Two important points can be made regarding the organizational socialization literature and how it relates to work values. First, the organization does not usually need to create an entirely new set of values in its employees. Individuals are initially attracted to organizations with which they have attributes in common (Schneider, 1987). Similarly, the selection literature shows that interviewers prefer applicants who are similar to themselves (e.g., Rynes & Gerhart, 1990; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). Nevertheless, organizations are likely to be comprised of individuals with at least some variability in personality, socio-economic background, and values. Uncertain economic conditions, loyalty to norms of a particular profession, unrealistic perceptions of the other party by the prospective employee or organizational representative, and the natural variation due to a large population of individuals imply that individuals will not be identical and that some amount of socialization is in order.

A related issue is whether it is even in the best interests of the organization for individuals to conform with every aspect of organizational values. Thus, a model of work values in which the individual may not accept social influence in every situation complements Schein's (1968) view of the creative individualist who only accepts the pivotal norms of the organization.

A second point is that individuals do not always respond to socialization attempts. Although many traditional stage models (e.g., Buchanan, 1974; Feldman, 1976) assume that newcomers will adopt new values during the socialization process, recent research (Adkins, 1992; Ravlin, Meglino, & Adkins, 1989) implies that socialization does not always result in changes in individuals' work values. Bell
and Staw (1987) also support the idea that organizational influence is not as strong as once thought. Recent research (Chao, Kozlowski, Major, & Gardner, 1994; Morrison, 1993) has emphasized the newcomer's role in information seeking or learning processes; however, gaining information does not necessarily mean assimilating it.

The current work value framework can help explain what type of values will most easily be influence during organizational socialization and be adopted by individuals.

**Contribution of the Work Values Framework**

Work values falling along certain dimensions of the work values framework are more likely to be amenable to socialization attempts than others. Values on the social consensus end of the continuum will be more easily influenced by socialization tactics. Although values are relatively stable, the steps taken in many socialization strategies (e.g., unfreezing, "upending experiences," or coercive persuasion; Schein, 1968) can serve to exert a great deal of social influence as newcomers seek to regain their sense of efficacy. Even in less severe socialization techniques, conformity pressures can influence socially desirable values. Furthermore, values such as these about which there is a consensus in the organization are ones about which newcomers will proactively seek information.

In contrast, work values in the personal-preference quadrant are unlikely to be affected by socialization attempts because the content deals largely with preferences for type of work environment. Personal values such as these are more likely to be formed through direct experience; thus, they are stronger, more stable over time, and less susceptible to social influence (Fazio & Zanna, 1981). For
example, if individuals find that they value autonomy in their work environment, they are unlikely to be convinced otherwise. Research has shown this type of work values to be related to job choice (e.g., Ben-Shem & Avi-Itzhak, 1991). Thus, it is likely that newcomers either enter with work values that match the organization, or that they will discover a poor fit between themselves and the organization and subsequently leave.

Finally, the question of whether individuals will adhere to the organization's ethics code is evidenced by the distinction between the personal-moral and the social consensus-moral quadrants. Whether socialization will successfully affect individuals' adherence to the organization's ethical code is determined by the extent to which they agree with the organization's values or extol a different, personal ethical code. There may be conflict between individual and organizational values that cannot be resolved by socialization attempts. Conflict may also be created if work group values are at odds with larger organizational values; in this situation, individuals are more likely to accept the influence of their work group (Schein, 1968).

Theorists and practitioners have tended to view the socialization process as occurring in the same manner no matter what the particular socialization content, be it technical or social information (see Morrison, 1993 for an exception to this rule). As the discussion of the different types of work values illustrates, this is not the case even within the domain of work values. Recognizing different types and conceptualizations of work values is vital. Using only Pryor's work preference values, for example, would lead one to believe that work values cannot be changed at all. On the other hand, only considering England's value system implies that values are relatively easy to change.
It should be noted, however, that type of work value is not the only factor in whether individuals adopt organizational values. Value change is also dependent on pre-existing socialization or socialization to working itself (see Work Socialization of Youth research project; e.g., Claes & Ruiz-Quintanilla, 1994) and on the strength of the organizational culture (Adkins, 1992). An organization that has no widely propagated value system is not likely to impact the work values of organizational members. Nonetheless, the social influence manifested in both organizational socialization and work value formation demonstrates the interrelatedness of the two domains and the relevance of the work values framework.

The implication for organizational practice is that once leaders have determined the values to be sought in their members, the classification of those values according to the work values framework will help them establish the appropriate policy for ensuring that newcomers do, in fact, hold pivotal values. Personal-preference values would best be acquired through selection since post-employment socialization attempts are not likely to be effective. It is also important to characterize the personal-preference values necessary for the job and not the organization as a whole. For example, some positions may require more autonomy than others. In contrast, social consensus values are more malleable and can be influenced by socialization tactics and by disseminating information to newcomers. Moral values are an important consideration in light of increasing societal scrutiny of ethical issues (Payne, 1980; Saul, 1981), but they create a special challenge. It is unlikely that a strategy of selection or socialization alone would be sufficient. Selection efforts should be informative regarding the
ethical climate of the organization and act as a screening device. Socialization can then further refine and sustain ethical norms.

In summary, values are diagnostic of one's identity, self-worth, and worldview; as such, they have major implications for our lives and our interactions with others. Because so much of our time is spent in a working environment, work values are particularly significant and salient. Work values have implications for the kind of career we choose, the work environment we prefer, and the kinds of decisions we will make. Clearly, however, work values are not all of one type, and these types have implications for organizational life, particularly the effectiveness of socialization attempts.
References


Work Values

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Work Values


Figure Caption

Figure 1. A Framework for Work Values.