Title

Dispute resolution mechanisms and teacher bargaining outcomes

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-1-1996

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of dispute resolution mechanisms on the wages and hours of public school teachers. The 43-state analysis presents evidence that (1) a permissible right to strike increases teacher wages by 11.5 percent and reduces class hours by 37 minutes per day; (2) a de facto right to strike increases salaries by 5.7 percent and reduces class hours by 44 minutes per day; (3) arbitration availability is associated with a wage effect of 3.6 percent and 70 fewer class minutes per day; and (4) factfinding and voluntary arbitration have no significant influences on outcomes. A direct comparison of the right to strike and the right to arbitrate indicates that a legal right to strike affords teachers greater power to increase the dollar value of their work.

Comments

Zigarelli, M. A. (1996). Dispute resolution mechanisms and teacher bargaining outcomes. Journal of Labor Research, 17(1), 135–148. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685789

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